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AR: antibiotic resistance  
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Usage of antibiotics selects for resistant bacteria, resulting in reduced treatment options, and 
increased morbidity and mortality from microbial infections.  
Development of resistance in susceptible bacteria can occur through spontaneous mutation or 
horizontal gene transfer (HGT). Our current understanding of resistance development in bacterial 
pathogens is more descriptive than predictive in nature. That is, whereas the acquisition or 
development of new resistance determinants in bacteria can be retrospectively described 
relatively easily at the molecular, species and geographical distribution levels, the initial 
horizontal transfer events, the resistance gene donor, and the environmental location and 
conditions that produced the first generation of the resistant bacteria remain largely unknown. 
Without this latter knowledge and without a clear understanding of directional selection and 
genetic drift in natural bacterial populations, it is impossible to predict accurately further 
resistance development occurring through HGT.  
Some of the antibiotic resistance marker (ARM) genes used in the production of genetically 
modified organisms (GMO) encode resistance to antibiotics in clinical and veterinary use. Thus, 
concerns have been raised that the large-scale release of such genes in commercialized GMOs 
may increase the rate of, and broaden the locations where, bacteria horizontally acquire resistance 
genes.  
 
The European Food Safety authority (EFSA) opinion (2004) identifies two main criteria that can 
be adopted to approximate and supplement the lack of a direct predictive capability of the effect 
of ARM gene usage in GMOs. These two criteria are 1) identification of the current natural 
reservoirs of similar resistance genes (section 3.3.3), and 2) identification of selective conditions 
favouring bacteria that have acquired ARM genes (section 3.3.4). These criteria enable a 
comparative assessment of the relative contribution of ARM genes from GMOs to the overall AR 
gene reservoir in the environment, and to resolve whether rare bacterial transformants that have 
acquired ARM genes are likely to undergo positive selection leading to clinically troublesome 
populations.  
 
The EFSA opinion categorizes the most frequently used ARM genes into 3 groups. The EFSA 
panel considers that there is no rationale to restrict or prohibit the use of ARM genes in Group 1, 
(nptII, hpt) that the use of ARM genes in Group 2 (cat, str, blaTEM-1) should be restricted to field 
trial purposes only, and that ARM genes in Group 3 (nptIII, tetA) should not be present in 
genetically modified plants (GMPs) to be placed on the market, or in GMPs used for 
experimental field trials. The opinion of the EFSA panel does not necessarily reflect the more 
precautionary motivated regulations of ARM genes for commercial use in food and feed in 
Norway.  
 
The Norwegian Scientific Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms and the Panel on Biohazards 
appointed an ad hoc group to conduct a scientific risk assessment on the use of ARM genes in 
GMOs, as outlined under the terms of reference (section 1). The ad hoc group observes that there 
are differences between European countries in bacterial resistance levels and usage levels of 
antibiotics, representing the two main criteria used by the EFSA panel for classification of the 
ARM genes. The ad hoc group has therefore focused on conditions of particular relevance for the 
long-term effects of introduction of ARM genes to Norway, and Norwegian levels of antibiotic 
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resistance and antibiotic usage patterns. 
 
Literature survey indicates that only few data are available on the prevalence of the nptII gene in 
Norway. The limited data suggest the Group 1 gene nptII is only present at low proportions in 
bacteria from natural and clinical environments in Norway. The nptII gene has been found in 
manure and sewage in a limited number of samples from the Netherlands and Germany. 
However, since past and present agricultural usage of antibiotics varies considerably between 
countries, these observations need to be documented in Norwegian environments. Given the 
current usage pattern of aminoglycosides in Norway, and the low level of phenotypic resistance 
to aminoglycosides in pathogenic bacteria in Norway, the large scale introduction of the nptII 
gene in food and feed could pose a risk to animal health. More information on nptII gene copy 
number in relevant Norwegian environments may alter this observation.  Little information is 
available on the distribution and ecology of the hpt gene. However, due to the limited clinical 
impact of this gene, in both medical and veterinary settings, the ad hoc group has not identified 
specific concerns on the usage of this gene as an ARM. 
 
The Group 2 gene, blaTEM-1, is unlikely to be present at high concentrations in natural 
environments in Norway. However, clinical studies of E. coli and other enterobacterial isolates 
suggest that the blaTEM-1 gene is present in considerable quantities in the intestinal system of 
humans. Despite the apparently high prevalence of this gene among bacteria that are widely 
distributed in anthropogenic environments, the antibiotics to which the blaTEM-1 gene confers 
resistance are widely used in clinical and veterinary treatment of infections in Europe, including 
Norway. This suggests that there is a narrow species distribution of the resistance gene and that 
the gene is present within these few host bacterial populations in high proportions. The str gene 
seems to have a broad distribution among various habitats in Europe, although copy number 
estimates are rarely provided. Little information is available on the cat gene distribution among 
species and environments in Europe. The broad usage and utility of the antibiotics to which the 
blaTEM-1 gene confers resistance, combined with the observation of emerging ampicillin resistance 
in previously susceptible species, suggests that precautions should be taken against the 
dissemination of AR genes in environments that are selective for bacterial transformants carrying 
specific ARM genes.  
 
It is unclear how the EFSA opinion and assessment (EFSA, 2004) define and distinguish 
quantitatively the prevalence of the genes in relation to the group categorization and assessment 
made. It is also unclear if the prevalence argument is based on considerations of the ARM copy 
number only, or if the relative presence of ARM gene homologues among relevant clinical 
isolates in different countries is also considered. The lack of relevant data and quantitative 
definitions easily leads to subjective and contested interpretations of the relevant usage level and 
the resistance level for the group categorization. The ad hoc group recommends strengthening of 
public research efforts to resolve some of the major knowledge gaps identified for the direct and 
indirect effects of ARM genes (and other food-derived DNA) on human health (section 5). This 
is necessary to develop scientific consensus on the quantitative definitions of the categorization 
criteria as presented in the EFSA opinion (EFSA, 2004). Furthermore, data on the specific usage 
of the relevant antibiotics and corresponding resistance patterns in Europe needs to be 
systematically collected to improve ARM gene risk assessment further and to enable 
epidemiological monitoring of ARM gene homologues.  
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1. Terms of Reference 
 
In a letter dated 11 February 2005, the Norwegian Food Safety Authority requested the 
Norwegian Scientific Committee for Food Safety to perform an assessment of the risk to human 
health and the environment on the use of antibiotic (antimicrobial) resistance (AR) genes as 
marker genes for genetically modified organisms (GMOs). The assessment should identify 
possible knowledge gaps and uncertainties related to such risk, and also consider the need for 
antibiotic resistance marker (ARM) genes in GMOs, possible alternatives to ARM genes, and 
possible risks connected to the alternatives. Finally, the assessment should consider the resistance 
situation in Norway, as compared to the situation in other European countries, and the use of 





The introduction of genetic material into the cells and genomes of higher organisms is only 
infrequently successful. It is therefore necessary to have the means to discriminate between cells 
that have acquired the intended genetic insertion, versus the large majority of cells that remain 
unmodified. Selectable marker genes are used extensively in genetic engineering to allow rapid 
identification and selective amplification of cells that have successfully received the new genetic 
material. Marker genes encoding antibiotic resistance (ARM genes) are often used for higher 
organisms because these allow dominant selection to be included in the growth medium of the 
modified cells/tissues. The marker genes have no function in the product, but since their 
subsequent removal is difficult, they often remain in the commercialized GMO. Due to the lack 
of peer-reviewed data demonstrating either the long-term safety or an associated risk of ARM 
genes, it has been difficult to reach scientific, regulatory and public consensus on the continued 
use of such marker genes in commercialized transgenic plants (Nap et al., 1992, WHO, 1993, 
2000, FDA, 1998, Kok et al., 1994, Kärenlampi, 1996, Salyers, 1996, Metz and Nap, 1997, Kruse 
and Jansson, 1997, Nielsen et al., 1998, Malik and Saroha, 1999, GM Science Review Panel, 
2003).  
 
The presence of ARM genes in commercialized GMOs does not result in an agricultural or 
consumer benefit. Moreover, the continual increase in resistance to antibiotics observed for most 
major pathogens has resulted in the Norwegian government taking a restrictive and precautionary 
approach on the use of ARM genes in the production of GMOs intended for release and sale in 
Norway. The Norwegian National Assembly has adopted two regulations that prohibit the 
commercial production, and import and sale of GM food (from 1 June 2002) and feed (from 7 
November 2002) where inserted ARM genes are present and intact in the final product. 
 
In Europe, the presence of ARM genes in GMOs has been controversial, partly due to the lack of 
specific guidelines regulating their use. Case-by-case assessments have put variable emphasis on 
the presence of ARM genes in GMOs and their potential health and environmental effects, if 
unintentionally transferred to pathogenic bacteria. Part B of Directive 2001/18/EF states that 
ARM genes should be taken into consideration when conducting risk assessments of GMOs 
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containing such genes, in particular genes expressing resistance to antibiotics in use for medical 
or veterinary purposes. According to the directive, ARM genes that may have adverse effects on 
human health and the environment should be identified and phased out. ARM genes that may 
confer adverse effects should be phased out before 31 December 2004, when present in GMOs 
intended for commercial use, and before 31 December 2008, when present in GMOs used for 
field trials. The directive 2001/18/EF also states that the future development of GM-plants to be 
placed on the market, and to be used in the production of food or feed, should aim to avoid genes 
that confer resistance to therapeutically relevant groups of antibiotics. 
 
In 2004 the Scientific Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO Panel) of the European 
Food Safety Authority (EFSA) published an opinion on environmental and health aspects of 
ARM genes, particularly those already in use in genetically modified plants (EFSA, 2004). The 
opinion considered seven different ARM genes and classified the genes according to their 
assessed potential for creating increased resistance to antibiotics in human and animal pathogens 
after horizontal transfer. Two main criteria were used to assess the potential impact of putative 
transfer and positive selection of ARM genes in pathogenic microorganisms: 1) the prevalence of 
the ARM gene homologues in natural microbial communities, and 2) the clinical and veterinary 
usage levels of the antibiotics to which the specific ARM gene confers resistance. Thus, data on 
the amount of the relevant antibiotics used in Europe, and the resistance levels to the relevant 
antibiotics in the European Union, provided a main baseline for the assessment. The ARM genes 
were classified by the EFSA GMO panel into 3 groups: 
 
Group 1:  Genes nptII and hpt, which confer resistance to the antibiotics 
kanamycin/neomycin/paromycin/butirosin/gentamicin B/geneticin or hygromycin, 
respectively. 
Group 2:  Genes Cmr (cat), Ampr (blaTEM-1) and str (aadA), which confer resistance to the 
antibiotics chloramphenicol, or ampicillin or streptomycin/spectinomycin, 
respectively. 
Group 3:  Genes nptIII and tetA, which confer resistance to the antibiotics amikacin or 
tetracyclines, respectively.  
 
The EFSA GMO Panel considered that there is no rationale for restricting or prohibiting the use 
of ARM genes placed in Group 1. The panel recommended that the use of ARM genes in Group 
2 should be restricted to field trial purposes only, and that ARM genes in Group 3 should not be 
present in GMPs to be placed on the market or in GMPs used for experimental field trials.  
 
The opinion of the EFSA GMO panel is not necessarily consistent with the precautionary 
motivated regulations for ARM genes for commercial use in food and feed in Norway. The 
Norwegian Scientific Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms and the Panel on Biohazards 
appointed an ad hoc group to conduct a scientific risk assessment on the use of ARM genes in 
GMOs, as outlined under the terms of reference. The Norwegian ad hoc group decided to 
consider the potential health and environmental effects of ARM genes placed by the EFSA GMO 
panel in Groups 1 and 2 only, since the restricted use of the ARM genes in Group 3 is in line with 
current Norwegian legislation.  
 
The ad hoc group observes that there are clear differences between European countries in 
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bacterial resistance levels and usage levels of antibiotics, representing the two main criteria used 
by the EFSA GMO panel for classification of the ARM genes. The ad hoc group has therefore 
focused on conditions of particular relevance to the long-term effects of ARM genes introduced 
into Norway, and Norwegian levels of antibiotic resistance and antibiotic usage patterns. The ad 
hoc group has considered only the potential effects of ARM genes present in GMPs.  
Given the limited documentation of alternative marker technology, the ad hoc group considered 
the task of reviewing biosafety aspects of alternative markers to require a substantial 
investigation and a separate assessment and report. Hence, an assessment of alternative marker 
technology has not been included here.   
 
 
3. Overview of environmental and health effects considered in the risk assessment 
 
ARM genes are originally isolated from naturally occurring bacteria from species-diverse 
microbial communities. Although the exact locations and prevalences of these genes are often not 
known, microorganisms in various environments are naturally exposed to such resistance genes 
at variable levels. Moreover, bacteria are known to transfer antibiotic resistance genes frequently 
between cells and species. The large-scale release of GMOs containing ARM genes may not 
necessarily, therefore, introduce new antibiotic resistance genes into a particular environment. 
However, the GMO introduction may change the environmental persistence and concentrations, 
of AR gene exposure to various microorganisms, and may alter the frequency and locations of 
such genes. The insertion of modified ARM genes into eukaryotic chromosomes in GMOs will 
necessarily alter the genomic locations of ARM genes substantially from those genomic locations 
AR genes usually occupy in prokaryotic microorganisms. The changed genomic insertion sites 
and positions may alter the stability and transferability of the ARM genes. However, AR genes 
are known to occupy a range of genomic locations in various microorganisms, making them 
some of the most dynamic genetic entities known.  
 
The ad hoc group has focused on the following potential effects caused by the presence of ARM 
genes in GMOs released in field trials or for commercial purposes:  
 
• 3.1 Toxic, allergenic or environmental effects caused by proteins encoded by ARM genes.  
 
• 3.2 Health effects caused by the uptake of intact ARM genes into mammalian cells.  
 
• 3.3 Indirect effects arising from the reduced ability to treat microbial infections after 
horizontal transfer and amplification of ARM genes in bacteria.  
 
In assessing the above potential effects, we have drawn upon the scientific findings and 
recommendations published in the EFSA opinion (EFSA, 2004). We have also independently 
reviewed the scientific literature to determine whether ARM genes pose risks that require further 
precautionary action or risk management, and whether national or regional antibiotic usage and 
antibiotic resistance patterns are consistent with the EFSA opinion and rationale for the proposed 
classification of ARM genes. It should be noted that commercial GMO developers utilizing ARM 
genes have certainly accumulated additional relevant knowledge on ARM genes that is not 
available in the scientific literature. Since such information is often confidential and not made 
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available to open peer-review, we have been unable to include these studies in our assessment. 
Finally, we have identified knowledge gaps and areas for further research in order to strengthen 
the scientific basis for the risk assessment of ARM genes.  
 
 
3.1 Potential toxic, allergenic or environmental effects caused by proteins encoded by ARM 
genes 
 
Bacteria harbouring AR genes can be found in many unprocessed or processed food sources as 
well as in the environment. Human or animal exposure to gene products (proteins) of AR genes is 
thus not exclusively linked to the consumption of GMOs. The levels of natural proteins encoded 
by AR genes present in bacteria ingested with food remain unknown. The large-scale usage of 
GMOs, some with constitutively expressed ARM genes, may result in higher levels of ARM gene 
products being present in GM-food than those produced by microbes naturally-present in food. 
Moreover, the new cytoplasmic locations of the ARM gene products may introduce post-
translational modifications of the proteins not present in microbially-produced counterparts. 
GMOs harbouring ARM genes will contain the gene product at variable concentrations 
depending on promoter type and activity, and cellular and environmental variables. High levels of 
ARM gene proteins can be produced in plants; e.g. up to 1% of the total cellular protein was 
NPTII in transplastomic plants harbouring an nptII gene expressed in plastids (Carrer et al., 
1993). Although experimentally determined concentrations of ARM gene products are rarely 
available in the scientific literature, lower concentrations would be expected to be produced by 
ARM genes localized to the plant nucleus. 
 
 
3.1.1 Acute toxicity 
 
Group 1 gene products 
NPTII. Several reviews on the safety of the nptII gene and corresponding protein have been 
published (e.g. Flavell et al., 1992, Nap et al., 1992, WHO, 1993, Redenbaugh et al., 1993, 1994). 
Peer-reviewed experimental data on the possible acute toxicity of the protein NPTII has been 
published by Monsanto (Fuchs et a., 1993b). In an acute mouse gavage study, (Fuchs et al., 
1993a) a microbially-expressed NPTII protein was used. Between 100 to 5000 mg NPTII 
protein/kg bodyweight was gavage-fed to mice. No deleterious effects were reported for the 8 to 
9 day period after NPTII administration and the study concluded that the protein poses no safety 
concerns. The recombinant bacterial NPTII protein has been found to be chemically and 
functionally equivalent to the plant (cotton, tomato and potato) expressed version (Fuchs et al., 
1993a). Given that this observation is representative across recombinant nptII host plants, 
information on the effects of exposure to NPTII proteins can be derived from comparisons with 
naturally-occurring exposure routes and sources of NPTII proteins.  
 
The nptII gene was originally found on a transposon (TN5) located on a plasmid (pJR67) from an 
enterobacterium (Berg et al., 1975) and has subsequently been observed in a range of 
enterobacterial species (Blasquez et al., 1996). Given the assumption that the nptII gene is 
expressed continually in these bacteria, and that the bacteria have a broad geographical 
distribution, the digestive tract of humans and animals will be naturally exposed to these 
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enzymes. Although the concentrations of naturally-occurring NPTII-producing bacteria and 
NPTII proteins in the gastrointestinal tract (GIT) of humans or animals has not been determined, 
health effects arising from the natural exposure to this enzyme have not been identified or 
reported.  
 
Given the rapid breakdown of the NPTII protein observed in simulated gastric fluid (SGF) and 
simulated intestinal fluid (SIF) (Fuchs et al. 1993b), together with the hypothesized natural 
exposure to NPTII proteins and the absence of acute toxic effects in mice, as reported by Fuchs et 
al., (1993b), the ad hoc group concludes that the NPTII protein expressed by ARM genes is 
highly unlikely to pose toxic effects. Our conclusion assumes that neither potential post-
translational modifications of the NPTII protein that may occur in other species and cytoplasmic 
conditions than those examined by Fuchs et al. (1993a), nor the protein degradation products will 
produce toxicological effects. 
 
HPT. We are not aware of any peer-reviewed studies that have examined the acute toxicity of the 
enzyme HPT. The ad hoc group is not aware of any scientific studies or indications that would 
suggest that HPT poses acute toxicity risks in mammalian systems. Earlier assessments have not 
found such indications (Kärenlampi, 1996), but point to the lack of relevant scientific studies 
regarding: 1) the novelty of the gene product for humans; 2) detailed sequence comparisons to 
known toxic or allergenic proteins; and 3) detailed investigations of pleiotrophic effects i.e. the 
phosphorylation state of the plant cell (Kärenlampi, 1996).  
 
Acknowledging the uncertainty and lack of relevant scientific studies, the ad hoc group is of the 
opinion that hpt gene products are unlikely to produce acute toxic effects.  
 
Group 2 gene products 
Group 2 enzymes are not intended for commercial use or consumption, and are not considered 
further here.  
 
 
3.1.2. Allergy caused by exposure to ARM gene products 
 
Group 1 gene products 
NPTII. The NPTII protein has been reported to be rapidly degraded in SGF and SIF (Fuchs et al. 
1993b). Degradation was observed within seconds in the SGF, and minutes in the SIF, as 
measured by Western blots and the enzymatic activity of the proteins was destroyed after 2-15 
min incubation in SGF or SIF (Fuchs et al., 1993b). Based on the rapid digestion of the protein, 
the expected history of natural exposure of humans and animals to the NPTII protein without the 
identification of allergenic effects, and the lack of identified homology between the NPTII 
protein and known allergens, the authors suggested that the NPTII protein should not cause 
allergenicity concerns (Fuchs et al., 1993b). The reliability of in vitro digestion as an indicator of 
allergenic properties has later been questioned (Spök et al., 2004). The ad hoc group is not aware 
of any data suggesting that the Group 1 enzyme NPTII is likely to cause allergenic reactions 
beyond those potentially caused by naturally occurring NPTII enzymes in bacteria present in the 
GIT of humans and animals.  
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HPT. The ad hoc group is not aware of any peer-reviewed studies that have examined the 
allergenic potential of the HPT enzyme or other information that would suggest that exposure to 
the HPT enzyme via food consumption will result in allergenic reactions. Acknowledging the 
uncertainty and lack of relevant scientific studies, the ad hoc group is of the opinion that hpt gene 
products are unlikely to produce allergenic reactions. 
 
Group 2 gene products 





3.1.3. Accumulation of ARM gene products in the environment 
 
Group 1 gene products 
NPTII. It has been estimated that the concentration of NPTII protein in plants is between 3-440 
ng per mg of soluble protein (see Kärenlampi, 1996). As described in section 3.1.2, the NPTII 
protein has been reported to be rapidly degraded in SGF and SIF (Fuchs et al. 1993b), indicating 
that the NPTII protein is not unusually stable to hydrolytic activities. Natural environments 
contain high number of saprophytic bacteria capable of degrading organic matter, including 
proteins (Burns and Dick, 2002).  
 
The ad hoc group is of the opinion that the NPTII protein is likely to be rapidly degraded upon 
exposure to saprophytic bacteria in the environment, and that no biosafety relevant concerns have 
been identified, or suggested, in the scientific literature, regarding possible long-term 
accumulation of NPTII proteins in the environment.  
 
HPT. The ad hoc group is not aware of any scientific studies that have examined the stability of 
the hpt-encoded proteins. The ad hoc group is not aware of any information that suggest the HPT 
proteins are likely to have characteristics that make it more stable than other proteins naturally 
present in bacterial cytoplasms.  
 
Acknowledging the uncertainty and lack of relevant scientific studies, the ad hoc group is of the 
opinion that the HPT protein is likely to be rapidly degraded upon exposure to saprophytic 
bacteria in the environment, and that no biosafety relevant concerns have been identified, or 
suggested, in the scientific literature, regarding possible long-term accumulation of HPT proteins 
in the environment.  
 
Group 2 gene products.  
Due to the limited size and duration of field trials, the ad hoc group considers the potential 











3.1.4 Inactivation of orally administered antibiotics by ARM gene encoded proteins present 
in food 
 
Ingestion of food containing ARM genes encoding active enzymes could hypothetically lead to 
the inactivation of orally-administered antibiotics in the GIT. Although several theoretical 
assessments are available (Nap et al., 1992, Redenbaugh et al., 1993, 1994), we are not aware of 
any in vivo studies that have systematically examined the effects on antibiotic treatment in 
humans or animals following ingestion of food containing Group 1 ARM genes. Experimental 
studies are not available that detail the relative contribution of ARM gene encoded Group 1 
enzymes, as compared to the enzymes produced by the indigenous microflora of humans or 
animals, to the inactivation and absorption kinetics of orally-administered antibiotics.  
 
Group 1 gene products 
NPTII and HPT enzyme activity in the GIT of humans. Antibiotics that may be inactivated by 
Group 1 enzymes (NPTII, and HPT) are not orally administered to humans in Norway, and cross-
resistance to orally-administered antibiotics in Norway has not been reported.  
 
The ad hoc group is of the opinion that Group 1 ARM genes will not interfere with the stability 
or effect of orally-administered antibiotics to humans in Norway.  
 
NPTII and HPT enzyme activity in the GIT of domestic animals. Antibiotics inactivated by 
the Group 1 enzyme NPTII may be administered to animals in Norwegian husbandry. The main 
usage of neomycin is for the treatment of gastrointestinal infections of piglets and calves (H. 
Kruse, pers. comm.). The estimated usage of neomycin in Norway is 35 kg per year 
(NORM/NORM-VET, 2003). It is not used in Norwegian aquaculture.  
A reduced effect of orally administered neomycin can be theoretically predicted to occur in 
husbandry given i) continued exposure to ARM gene encoded proteins present in feed and ii) 
survival and activity of the ARM gene encoded enzymes in the relevant parts of the GIT. The 
NPTII protein has been reported to be rapidly degraded in GIT simulations (Fuchs et al., 1993a). 
Although it is unclear if the protein has a comparably short degradation time in vivo when present 
in unprocessed food sources, no features have been identified in the protein suggesting that it will 
not undergo rapid degradation in the GIT of mammals. The NPTII enzyme requires Mg2+, ATP 
and a pH range of 7-7.5 for optimal activity (Ganelin et al., 1980). It is therefore unlikely that 
NPTII enzymes will functional optimally in the GIT of humans or animals, even if some enzymes 
survive immediate digestion. Processing of food is likely to inactivate (denature, hydrolyze) 
substantial proportions of the NPTII proteins.  
 
The digestive tract of higher animals is known to harbour a range of bacteria encoding enzymes 
inactivating antibiotics such as neomycin (e.g. Blasquez et al., 1996). Thus, the relative 
contribution of ARM gene products to inactivation of antibiotics intended for use in the digestive 
system is unclear and probably low. Experimental data from relevant animal models to resolve 
the hypothetical outcome of a reduced activity of orally-administered neomycin due to ARM 
gene usage are not available in the peer-reviewed literature. A brief description of a study on 
neomycin stability in feed is given in Redenbaugh et al. (1994), but lacks experimental detail and 
peer-review, thus excluding the incomplete information from further consideration here. 
Redenbaugh et al. (1993) provide theoretical calculations on the exposure of humans to the nptII 
05/302-1-final 




gene and gene products, and conclude that they are not of significant concern.  
 
The ad hoc group is of the opinion that the Group 1 ARM gene encoded protein NPTII is 
unlikely to contribute significantly to the enzymatic inactivation of neomycin orally-administered 
in veterinary medicine in Norway. Thus, we consider the risk related to the presence of ARM 
gene encoded NPTII proteins in animal feed to be low. However, the continued efficiency of 
neomycin in Norwegian veterinary medicine after possible ARM gene introductions, must also 
be considered in relation to potential selection of horizontal transfers of ARM genes into 
pathogenic bacteria, as discussed in section 3.3.  
 
Group 2 gene products 
Group 2 ARM genes will not be used for commercial purposes and only a few field releases are 
expected for these ARM genes in Norway, until their prohibition on 31 December 2008. Since 
Group 2 ARM genes will not be used in commercial products, the ad hoc group has not 
considered these further here. 
 
 
3.1.5. Conclusions from section 3.1 
 
The limited number of experimental studies available to resolve the questions raised in sections 
3.1.1 to 3.1.4 has resulted in an assessment that is based mainly on comparative experience and 
inference, rather than on direct experimental or epidemiological verification of the absence of 
effects. Most of the assumptions of a low (insignificant) risk produced by the release and 
exposure to ARM gene encoded enzymes, are based on inference from lack of observable effects 
from human and environmental exposure to naturally-occurring counterparts of the ARM gene 
encoded proteins. Although the natural concentrations of these resistance enzymes are often 
unknown, deleterious consequences from natural exposure to these enzymes have not, to the 
extent investigated, been reported. After reviewing the EFSA opinion paper (EFSA, 2004) and 
the scientific literature as described above, the ad hoc group considers the risk to be low for 
Group 1 ARM gene encoded proteins released in Norway. Due to the highly limited release of 
Group 2 ARM gene encoded proteins expected in Norway, the ad hoc group does not consider 
that the limited release of these proteins constitutes a health or environmental risk. 
 
 
3.2 Potential health effects caused by the uptake of intact ARM genes into mammalian cells 
 
All food has organic origins and therefore contains variable amounts of DNA. It has been 
estimated that humans ingest between 0.1 to 1 g of DNA in their food per day, and cows 60 g of 
DNA per day (Doerfler, 2000, GM Science Review Panel, 2003). Exposure to feed-ingested 
DNA is thus a common feature of higher organisms. GM-DNA is not considered to differ 
significantly from the chemical composition and structure of other DNA molecules present in 
food. When compared to the overall amount of DNA ingested and the proportion of the genome 
of the organism that has been modified, the quantity of GM-DNA ingested is only a minor 
fraction. The modified genes used in GMOs are collected from a variety of organisms. Although 
the modified genes may be considered novel, they have been isolated, cloned and modified from 
naturally-occurring living organisms. Thus, the novelty of the ARM genes in commercial use is 
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caused by their altered genetic context and regulation, rather than by their capability of producing 
unique proteins with novel amino acid compositions. Conceivably, the new genetic context and 
altered regulation of ARM genes in GMOs may introduce properties of importance for novel 
expression patterns, genetic stability, and degradation products of the transgene during the 
normal processing of feed-derived DNA in mammals. Many recent studies have established that 
small proportions of feed-derived DNA can be found in the bloodstream of mammals (see 
below). Although a relatively recent discovery, there are no indications that transgenes should 
behave any differently in the intestines of mammals, or cause other effects in the bloodstream, 
than any other DNA present in food.  
 
 
3.2.1 Uptake of ARM genes into epithelial cells 
 
In addition to DNA present in the diet, large amounts of DNA are produced and released (upon 
cell death) by microorganisms present in the GIT. The GIT contents and faeces also consist of 
significant proportions of epithelial cells, and hence, DNA from the host organism. ARM genes 
present in ingested foods could hypothetically be absorbed by luminal cells in the GIT causing 
unknown, but potentially negative, effects. Many studies have shown that food-ingested DNA 
may reach, or pass, luminal cells, although the proportion of the initially ingested DNA, and the 
size and quality of such DNA is likely to vary considerably depending on food source and 
digestive system. Table 1 outlines studies examining the stability of DNA in various gut systems. 
It is clear that the great majority of DNA molecules are substantially degraded upon digestion. 
However, purified DNA, or DNA present in GM soya and GM-maize, was not fully degraded in 
human intestinal simulations (Martín-Orúe et al, 2002). A recent study of human volunteers, 
including ileostomists (i.e. individuals in which the terminal ileum has been resected and the 
digesta are diverted via a stoma to a colostomy bag) fed GM-soy products, reported that 
fragments of DNA survive the passage through the small bowel, but cannot be detected in the 
faeces of volunteers with an intact digestive tract (Netherwood et al, 2004). Chowdhury et al. 
(2003 a, b) reported that DNA ingested by pigs fed GM-maize was not totally degraded and that 
DNA fragments could be detected in caecal and rectal contents. Whilst all studies performed to 
date suggest that most DNA entering the digestive system of mammals will be degraded, there 
are very few quantitative studies on the size distribution and the proportion of DNA remaining in 
various parts of the digestive tract, or surviving digestion. Several studies suggest that 
mammalian cells in culture can take up free-DNA (Anker et al., 2004, and references within), and 
many in vivo studies, as described in section 3.2.2, demonstrate that feed-derived DNA can pass 
luminal cells to reach various tissues in mammals. The mechanisms behind such transfer need to 
be further resolved and we are not aware of studies that have specifically investigated the uptake 
of ARM genes into luminal cells of humans or animals in vivo.  
 
The ad hoc group considers that the observations communicated in the available peer-reviewed 
studies (as listed in Table 1) make it probable that minor proportions of intact ARM genes 
present in food, will be exposed to luminal cells. The ad hoc group is not aware of any studies 
indicating that ARM genes will behave differently, or cause any other effects than those caused 
by the high diversity of food-derived genes naturally exposed to luminal cells. Nor is the ad hoc 
group aware of any studies indicating that the natural uptake of free, food-derived DNA 
molecules from the intestinal system produces a biological effect in the host. Despite the large 
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uncertainty regarding the biological mechanisms following DNA exposure to luminal cells, the 
ad hoc group is of the opinion that ARM genes do not differ so significantly in composition or 
concentration from the wide range of naturally occurring DNA present in various food sources 
and the indigenous microflora in the gut of humans and animals that they are likely to cause 
further biological effects. The ad hoc group recommends that further studies should be performed 
to clarify the basic biological mechanisms behind translocation and transport of food-derived 




Table 1. Examples of peer-reviewed studies using PCR methodology to examine 
the fate of recombinant DNA in food during digestion. 
DNA source Model system Reference 
GM corn Chickens Aeschbacher et al., 2005 
GM oilseed rape Cows Alexander et al., 2004 
GM corn Chickens Chambers et al, 2002 
GM corn Pigs Chowdhury et al, 2003a,b 
GM corn Calves Chowdhury et al, 2004 
GM corn Sheep saliva, rumen fluid Duggan et al, 2000, 2003 
GM corn Cows, chickens Einspanier et al, 2001, 2004 
GM soybean Chickens Jennings et al., 2003a 
GM corn Pigs  Jennings et al., 2003b 
GM corn, GM soya Human digestion simulations Martín-Orúe et al, 2002 
GM corn Various Nemeth et al., 2004 
GM soya Humans (ileostomists) Netherwood et al, 2004 
GM corn, GM soya Cows Phipps et al, 2003 
GM soya Cows’ blood, milk, urine, 
faeces 
Poms et al, 2003 
GM corn Pigs Reuter and Aulrich, 2003 
GM corn Chickens Tony et al., 2003 
GM corn Rats Hammond et al., 2004, 2005 









3.2.2 Unintended uptake and transport of ARM genes to other tissues 
 
The possible uptake of ARM genes from the GIT of mammals may hypothetically produce 
unintended consequences, after dissemination of ARM genes into various tissues. The 
identification of the uptake and dissemination of feed-derived DNA into mammalian tissues has 
been reported in a series of studies by Doerfler and colleagues (Schubbert et al., 1994, 1997, 
1998, Doerfler et al., 2001). After feeding foreign DNA to mice, DNA fragments were 
demonstrated to have been absorbed in the gastrointestinal system, and could be detected in 
leucocytes, spleen, liver and kidney (Schubbert et al. 1997). The foreign DNA was detected in 
spleen and liver at 18 hours after feeding. In one instance the foreign DNA could be shown to 
have become covalently linked to mouse DNA. The same group later found that plasmids fed to 
pregnant mice could be transferred to foetuses, and later detected in the brain, eye, liver and heart 
of the offspring (Schubbert et al. 1998). Similar observations of extensive tissue distribution of 
feed-derived DNA have been made in a number of subsequent studies (see also some of the 
studies cited in Table 1). In chicken and cattle, fragments of plant DNA have been observed in 
muscle, liver, spleen and kidney after feeding with corn (Einspanier et al, 2001). Hohlweg and 
Doerfler (2001) detected the plant-specific ribulose-1,5-biphosphate carboxylase/oxygenase gene 
in the liver and spleen of mice following feeding with soybean leaves. Up to 0.1% of DNA 
orally-administered to mice can be retrieved in the animals’ blood (Doerfler, 1996). Similarly, 
0.1% of orally administered DNA has been retrieved from fish blood (Nielsen et al., 2005a, b;). 
However, feeding experiments demonstrated that the DNA is transferred from the GIT to the 
blood over several hours and undergoes continuous elimination and degradation. Thus, based on 
available data, it has been estimated that approximately 1% of dietary DNA is absorbed from the 
GIT (Nielsen et al., 2005b). 
 
Few studies have been performed on the possible distribution of ingested DNA in human tissues. 
Small amounts of ingested DNA have been shown to circulate in human plasma/serum (Anker 
and Stroun, 2000). DNA entering the bloodstream is likely degraded by DNase activity in human 
serum and plasma (Connolly et al. 1962, Rozenberg-Arska et al. 1984).  
 
The ad hoc group is of the opinion that although major knowledge gaps exist in the general 
understanding of the proportion and pathways of feed-derived DNA entering the bloodstream of 
mammals, there is no evidence suggesting that the ARM genes in current use will create 
biological effects further than that of any other DNA fragment released into the GIT from food or 
the intestinal microflora and entering the bloodstream.  
 
 
3.2.3. Conclusions from section 3.2 
 
The lack of a detailed understanding of the uptake mechanisms, transport pathways and 
degradation dynamics of food-derived DNA in the bloodstream of mammals represents major 
knowledge gaps that warrant further research. Moreover, the lack of quantitative data on the 
DNA fragment size distribution in the digestive system of mammals digesting food from a 
variety of sources makes precise predictions of DNA exposure rates, and the relevant physical 
locations of DNA currently impossible. The possible interactions of ARM gene encoded proteins 
and their enzymatic activity with other proteins (proteome) in mammalian cytoplasms remains 
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unexplored and should be further clarified.  
 
While acknowledging the various identified knowledge gaps, the ad hoc group is of the opinion 
that mammalian exposure to ARM genes should be seen in relation to the daily exposure to DNA 
that mammals normally experience from any ingested food-source. The ad hoc group is not 
aware of any experimental evidence suggesting that ARM genes, or any other feed-derived DNA 




3.3. Indirect effects caused by a potentially reduced ability to treat microbial infections 
after horizontal transfer of ARM genes to bacteria 
 
Horizontal gene transfer (HGT) is known to be an important contributor to bacterial evolution 
and adaptation, for instance through the dissemination of AR genes in bacteria of clinical 
importance (Davison, 1999). HGT, when combined with positive selection (see section 3.3.4), 
can rapidly change the genetic composition of bacterial populations. Several mechanisms for 
HGT are known in bacteria (conjugation, transduction, and natural transformation) and AR genes 
are well known to transfer both among bacteria within the same species, and between different 
bacterial species. AR genes are often located on mobile genetic units with higher transfer 
frequencies among bacterial species than for chromosomal genes. HGT frequencies are generally 
considered to be lower among more divergent or unrelated species and few, if any, examples 
exist where bacteria have acquired plant genes and retained them in their genomes over 
evolutionary time. Nevertheless, the plant-pathogenic bacteria, Agrobacterium spp. are known to 
transfer specific bacterial genes naturally in the opposite direction, to plant cells.  
 
Although experimental evidence suggests bacterial genomes are naturally exposed to plant genes 
(Kay et al., 2002), a number of biological barriers can explain why few plant genes are retained 
in bacterial genomes (Thomas and Nielsen, 2005). However, several of these transfer barriers are 
absent in transgenes inserted in GMPs. For instance, the absence of introns, the presence of 
flanking vector DNA regions with high similarity to bacterial chromosomes, and the use of broad 
host range promoters may increase the likelihood of functional gene transfer of transgenes from 
GMPs to bacteria, as compared to transfer of other wild-type plant genes (Nielsen et al., 1998, 
Nielsen, 2003). The large-scale release of ARM genes in GMOs can hypothetically result in an 
undesired increase in the exposure level of bacteria to AR genes, as well as broadening of the 
locations and routes of exposure. Furthermore, the presence of flanking cloning vector sequences 
and the replacement of native promoters may alter the recombination potential of ARM genes in 
bacteria. Thus, when combined with positive selection of ARM gene harbouring bacteria, this 
"worst case" scenario could result in an increase in the occurrence of resistant bacteria.  
 
Development and spread of AR is an increasing global problem. Our understanding of the 
phenomenon is more descriptive than predictive. Whereas the bacterial acquisition of new 
resistance determinants can be retrospectively described relatively easily at the molecular, species 
and geographical distribution levels, the initial horizontal transfer events, the resistance gene 
donor, and the environmental location and conditions that produced the first generation of the 
resistant bacteria remains largely unknown. Without this latter knowledge and a thorough 
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understanding of the complex patterns of directional selection and genetic drift in natural 
bacterial populations, it is difficult to predict accurately further resistance development occurring 
through HGT and directional selection. 
 
The limited positive selection of bacteria carrying AR genes via the restricted use of antibiotics 
and physical isolation are currently considered the best methods to limit the spread of bacteria 
with acquired resistance. Thus, understanding the population dynamics of existing or newly 
generated resistant bacteria is essential to determine their long-term effects (Nielsen and 
Townsend, 2001, 2004).  
 The ad hoc group has considered the following aspects of the potential acquisition of ARM 
genes in bacteria: 
 
• 3.3.1 Mechanisms that could mediate horizontal transfer of ARM genes and their activity 
in relevant environments.  
• 3.3.2 Experimental studies seeking to clarify the occurrence of horizontal transfer of 
ARM genes from GMOs.  
• 3.3.3. Resistance mechanisms and prevalence of ARM gene homologues in bacterial 
communities. 
• 3.3.4. Selective conditions favouring bacteria harbouring ARM genes.  
 
 
3.3.1 Mechanisms that could mediate horizontal transfer of ARM genes and their activity in 
relevant environments 
 
The successful uptake and long-term persistence of ARM genes or any other foreign DNA within 
bacterial cells requires a number of steps: 
 
i) release of intact ARM genes from the cytoplasm of the GMO,  
ii) persistence of intact ARM genes in the environment,  
iii) exposure of the relevant species of competent bacteria to the ARM genes,  
iv) indiscriminate uptake of ARM genes by the bacteria,  
v) integration of the translocated ARM genes into a bacterial replicon to ensure stability over 
generations,  
vi) expression of the ARM genes in order to produce a selectable bacterial phenotype with 
new resistance characteristics, and  
vii) directional selection of rare bacterial transformants to produce population sizes that are 
clinically observable.  
 
Below, some aspects of the DNA release, persistence and uptake steps are discussed with 
particular focus on environments of relevance to GMOs and ARM genes.  
 
Release of intact ARM genes from GMOs. Several studies have monitored the persistence and 
stability of ARM genes in GMPs under various environmental conditions (Table 2). All the 
published studies indicate a gradual decrease in the quantity and quality of DNA over time. 
Widmer et al. (1997) reported that the nptII gene could be detected for up to 137 days in 
composted potato litter. Paget et al. (1998) used PCR to detect the aacC1 gene in tobacco litter 
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for up to 1 year. Gebhard and Smalla (1999) found positive PCR signals of DNA containing nptII 
genes from soil samples for up to 2 years after the initial farming of transgenic sugar beet (Beta 
vulgaris). Hay et al. (2002) could detect PCR amplifiable DNA fragments for up to 4 months 
from transgenic poplar leaves incubated in soil. Thus, although few quantitative estimates are 
available, DNA molecules from plants have been detected in soil for extended periods after 
harvest (Table 2). Although the biochemical conditions and physical locations enabling plant 
DNA to persist in agricultural environments is often unclear, the published observations suggest 
that minor proportions of the ARM genes present in growing or decomposing GMPs will be 
exposed to bacteria present in the phytosphere. It should be emphasized that, in most cases, the 
degradation rate of transgenic plant DNA containing ARM genes is expected to be equivalent to 
that of conventional DNA, and that the natural persistence of plant DNA (including ARM genes) 











Table 2. Studies of the long-term persistence of plant DNA in soil microcosms and 
in fields. 
Source of DNA (genes) Detection method Period 
detected 
Reference 
Ground tobacco leaf tissues 
added to soil microcosms 
(NOS and 35S CaMV) 
Extraction of total-
DNA, PCR 
120 days Widmer et al., 1996 
Tobacco leaves added to 
soil, potato litter on soil 




77-137 days Widmer et al., 1997 
Field sites with transgenic 





1 year Paget et al., 1998 
Soil microcosms with 
purified transgenic sugar 
beet DNA (nptII) 
Extraction of total-
DNA, PCR 
3-6 months Gebhard and Smalla, 
1999 
Field sites with transgenic 





2 years Gebhard and Smalla, 
1999 
Stored soil sampled from a 
potato field, and various 




>2 years De Vries et al., 2003 
Field sites with transgenic 












DNA stability in food and feed. Few studies have focused on the stability of DNA in raw or 
processed food or feedstuff (Pauli et al., 2000, Jonas et al., 2001). Conditions that may cause 
rapid inactivation or breakdown of extracellular DNA in common food sources are absent 
according to Bauer et al. (1999). Alexander et al., 2002 investigated the stability of DNA in 
various canola (Brassica sp.) substrates such as whole seed, cracked seed, meal, and diet. In most 
cases, DNA fragments large enough to contain intact plant genes were detected. However, 
processing most often decreases the persistence and stability of DNA in food (Pauli et al., 2000). 
Studies on food processing of e.g. soya, maize, potato and oil seeds, and excessive heat-treatment 
of plant tissue, such as autoclaving, have demonstrated that such procedures can yield highly 
fragmented DNA (Chiter et al., 2000, Kharazmi et al 2003a). Using gel-electrophoresis to analyse 
the degradation of DNA, Chiter et al., (2000) concluded that DNA remains largely intact within 
feedstuffs such as wet sugar beet pulp, cereal grains, and silage. Two additional studies have also 
shown variable stability of DNA in silage (Duggan et al., 2000, Einspanier et al. 2001). Methods 
are continually being developed to detect ARM genes in food and feed (Løvseth et al. 2001), 
however, DNA degradation during food and feed processing, means that intact ARM genes are 
only reliably detected in raw materials and unprocessed food. 
 
DNA stability in the digestive tract. Most extracellular DNA present in the digestive system has 
been demonstrated to undergo substantial degradation by nucleases, produced both by the 
digestive system and by intestinal bacterial saprophytes. Remaining DNA fragments are excreted 
in the faeces. Peer-reviewed studies on the persistence of DNA in various digestive systems 
report variation between organisms and locations (see references cited in Table 1). It is clear that 
although the majority of DNA is heavily fragmented upon digestion, some DNA fragments of a 
biologically relevant size (>1 kb) may be excreted in the faeces of various mammals. It should be 
noted that most studies on DNA stability in the digestive systems of mammals have used purified 
DNA, whereas most DNA is ingested as complex mixtures in food (Martín-Orúe et al., 2002). In 
a recent study using GM-soybean meal, Netherwood et al., (2004) reported that whereas some 
DNA fragments survived passage through the small bowel, transgenes could not be detected in 
the faeces of human volunteers. Chowdhury et al. (2003a;b) reported that DNA ingested by pigs 
fed GM-maize was not totally degraded, and that DNA fragments could be detected in caecal and 
rectal contents. The conditions that permit the persistence of intact DNA fragments during 
digestion remain undetermined, as does the extent to which such DNA fragments encounter 
competent bacteria in the digestive tract. 
 
Uptake of ARM genes by bacteria present in the digestive system. The microbial community 
inhabiting the GIT is characterized by its high population density and wide bacterial diversity 
(Backhed et al., 2005).  Up to 1014 bacteria may occur in the GIT, 10 times more than the total 
number of the somatic and germ cells present in humans. The human small intestine contains 
relatively low numbers of microbes (103 - 105/g or ml content) because of low pH and rapid flow 
in this region. The distal small intestine (ileum) contains higher bacterial numbers (108/g or ml 
content) than the upper part. The large intestine (colon) is the primary site of microbial 
colonization because of slow turnover and contains large numbers of bacteria (1010-1011/g or ml 
content), belonging to as many as 400 to 500 different species. The gut bacteria, when combined, 
may contain >100 times the number of different genes found in our genome. The flow-through of 
food in the GIT varies between the regions, with the retention of contents in the colon usually for 
longest (normally 2 to 3 days). The limited retention time provides a constraint on the possibility 
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of DNA transfer from food from occurring. The concentration of GM-DNA will always be 
extremely low compared to the total daily intake of DNA present in food, and additionally the 
DNA from bacteria in the GIT will also “dilute” the intake of GM-DNA.  
The animal digestive tract is hypothesized to be an environmental “hot spot” for bacterial gene 
transfer due to the high concentrations of nutrients and bacteria (Salyers, 1993). Nevertheless, 
few peer-reviewed studies are available on gene transfer processes and pathways in the digestive 
system of animals (Mercer et al., 1999b, Nielsen and Townsend, 2004). Currently only a few 
bacterial species from the digestive system of higher animals have been found to express 
competence in vitro, and none have been found to express competence in situ in the colon. Some 
studies have reported natural transformation to occur in situ in oral Streptococcus species 
(Westergren and Emilson 1983, Mercer et al. 1999a, Li et al., 2001). Other bacterial species 
inhabiting the animal digestive tracts like Helicobacter pylori and Campylobacter spp. are known 
to develop competence in vitro, although the biological significance of their possible ability to 
horizontally acquire naked DNA in the digestive system remains unclear. The ability of the 
human pathogen H. pylori to acquire naked DNA is of relevance to our assessment since 
ampicillin (to which resistance may be conferred by ARM gene blaTEM-1) may be used for the 
clinical treatment of H. pylori infections. Moreover, the bacterium cause infections in the 
stomach, which is a site where a higher proportion of intact feed-derived DNA fragments is likely 
to be present, as compared to subsequent sites in the digestive tract. Although stomach acid is 
thought to be deleterious to the survival of DNA, as inferred from experiments using simulated 
and natural gastrointestinal fluids (Redenbaugh et al., 1993, Duggan et al., 2000), the many 
recent observations of feed-derived DNA present in various parts of the digestive system of 
various animals (see Table 1) show that acid depurination of DNA is not as efficient as 
previously assumed. With the exception of DNA in saliva (e.g. Duggan et al., 2000), we are not 
aware of any experimental studies that have identified natural transformation of bacteria to occur 
in the mammalian digestive tracts. In general, only a few enterobacteria are known to be naturally 
transformable.  
 
Uptake of DNA by bacteria present in food. Many species of bacteria pathogenic to humans 
are food contaminants (food-borne pathogens) and grow well in various food sources. Thus, HGT 
of ARM genes in food is a plausible scenario and there is some evidence that bacteria have the 
ability to take up naked DNA present in food. Brautigam et al. (1997) and Zenz et al. (1998) 
detected natural transformation of B. subtilis, a common food contaminant, in milk. Bauer et al. 
(1999) detected plasmid transfer by natural transformation of E. coli in various foods, including 
milk, soy drink, tomato juice, carrot and other vegetable juice, supernatants of canned cabbage, 
soy beans, shrimps, and various mixes of canned vegetables. Kruse and Sørum (1994) showed 
that multi-resistance plasmids could readily be transferred by conjugation between bacteria from 
animals, fish and humans in simulated natural situations such as on a towel contaminated with 
milk from a cow with mastitis and on a chopping board contaminated with raw salmon. Although 
limited in numbers and scope, the above studies indicate that unprocessed or processed food may 
provide bacterial growth conditions suitable for HGT and possibly, natural transformation to 
occur. However, no studies are available on natural transformation in processed food where the 
DNA has been naturally present in the food (e.g. food containing ARM genes) since all the 
reported experimental designs are based on DNA and bacterial recipients being added into the 
food.   
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Several studies, as listed previously, demonstrate the persistence and transferability of naked 
DNA fragments in environmental settings of relevance to the introduction of GMOs. Although 
the majority of these studies have been performed with high concentrations of both introduced 
DNA and bacterial recipients, the ad hoc group is of the opinion that rare bacterial acquisitions of 
ARM genes cannot be excluded from occurring in these environments. Further studies are 
necessary to identify the conditions, sites and factors preventing or promoting such gene transfer 
events, particularly in the GIT of mammals. Very little information is available on the factors 
governing and preventing natural transformation of intestinal bacteria.  
 
 
3.3.2 Experimental studies of horizontal transfer of ARM genes from GMOs to bacteria 
 
Many opinions and assessments have been produced on the potential for ARM genes to be 
acquired by bacteria (e.g. Nap et al., 1992, FDA 1998, Kok et al., 1994, EFSA, 2004, Van den 
Eede et al, 2004). Two approaches have been used to elucidate the likelihood of transfer of ARM 
genes into bacteria. These include experimental laboratory studies on monocultures of bacteria 
exposed to GMP material (section 3.3.3.1), and examination of bacterial communities exposed to 
GMP material under semi-natural or natural conditions (section 3.3.3.2). For further reviews on 
HGT of transgenes in bacteria, see (Nielsen et al., 1998, 2001, Dröge et al., 1998, 1999, Bertolla 
and Simonet, 1999, Nielsen, 2003). 
 
 
3.3.2.1 Laboratory studies on bacteria exposed to ARM genes or GMP material 
 
Several laboratory studies have examined the likelihood of ARM gene transfer to defined 
bacterial species (Table 3). These studies have examined potential bacterial acquisitions of ARM 
genes, or gene fragments present as either purified DNA or in plant cells. The conditions for 
uptake of DNA in the monocultures of bacteria are often optimised, thus, presumably, but not 
necessarily, maximizing the likelihood of ARM gene uptake. The experimental set-up in the 
laboratory studies allows the potential transfer of ARM genes to be studied in a bacterial 
population of 107-109 bacteria, usually grown over a limited time period (<48 h). The limit of 
detection is often less than 1 successful ARM gene acquisition detected per 1010 to 1011 bacteria 
exposed. To date, none of these studies exposing wild-type bacteria to ARM genes have been 
able to demonstrate stable uptake in the bacterial species examined and therefore indicate that the 
transfer rates of ARM genes into the bacterial species and strains examined are nonexistent or 
below the limit of detection.  
 
Many studies on the requirements of integration of species-foreign DNA in bacteria have 
identified DNA sequence divergence as a main barrier. To increase the likelihood of transgene 
integration, several of the recent studies on the potential for transfer of ARM genes into bacteria 
have therefore introduced DNA sequence similarity to the plant transgene in the bacterium. 
Based on the presence of such defined DNA similarity in the bacteria, several recent studies now 
show that some bacterial species are capable of accessing and incorporating purified ARM gene 
fragments in vitro and in sterile soil (see references listed in Table 3).  
In situ uptake of ARM genes localized in organelles during bacterial colonization of tobacco 
plants has also been reported when high DNA sequence similarity is present (Kay et al., 2002). 
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The DNA similarity-based studies produced transformation frequencies of about 10-9 to 10-6 
transformants per exposed bacterium within a 24 h time period.  
The studies described in Table 3 indicate that bacteria are physiologically able to take up ARM 
genes and emphasize the importance of sequence similarity between plant transgenes and the 
bacterial genome for facilitating detectable levels of transfer. A study by Bensasson et al., 2004, 
identifies a range of bacteria that harbour DNA sequence similarity to the commonly used pUC18 
vector; suggesting sequence similarity conducive to recombination can be found between 
transgene constructs and bacteria naturally-present in various environments. The possible 
presence of sequences flanking ARM genes with high DNA similarity to bacteria may thus be of 
importance for understanding their transfer potential to naturally-occurring bacteria. The recent 
EFSA guidance document for the risk assessment of genetically plants and derived food and feed, 
specifically acknowledges this concern in section III.D.6, and recommends that the presence of 
bacterial sequences within the GMP insert DNA is minimised (EFSA, 2004). 
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Table 3. Experimental studies on ARM gene transfer from GMPs to bacteria with 
inserted DNA sequence similarity to the ARM gene.  
Plant material  Recipient bacterium  Transfer 
detecteda 
Purified potato and sugar beet DNA (Gebhard and 
Smalla, 1998) 
Acinetobacter sp.  yes  
Purified potato, sugar beet and oilseed rape DNA 
(De Vries and Wackernagel, 1998) 
Acinetobacter sp. yes 
Purified sugar beet DNA in sterile soil microcosms 
(Nielsen et al., 2000) 
Acinetobacter sp. yes 
Purified DNA and infected plants of potato and 








Infected potato plants (Kay et al., 2002) Acinetobacter sp. yes 
Plant material of Arabidopsis (Tepfer et al., 2003) Bacillus subtilis yes 
Purified tobacco DNA (Ceccherini et al., 2003) Acinetobacter sp. yes 
Purified DNA of sugarbeet (Meier and Wackernagel, 
2003)  
Acinetobacter sp. yes 
Purified DNA of potato, in vitro, in food and 




aTransfer frequencies range between 10-9 to 10-4 transformants per exposed recipient, 








3.3.2.2 Examination of bacterial communities exposed to ARM genes or GMPs under 
natural conditions 
 
Four published studies have investigated whether transgenes (e.g. ARM genes or epsps genes) 
present in GMPs can spread horizontally to exposed microbial communities in agricultural soils 
and in the intestines of human volunteers (Paget et al., 1998, Gebhard and Smalla, 1999, Badosa 
et al., 2004, Netherwood et al., 2004). The experimental designs of these studies are based on the 
phenotypic screening of bacterial populations for putative transformants carrying the monitored 
genes. The investigations also sampled the non-culturable fraction of bacteria present in soil or 
the intestine without identifying HGT events. Horizontal gene acquisitions occurring into non-
culturable bacteria (generally non-culturable, or not responsive to the media and conditions 
selected in the studies) remain exceedingly difficult to detect (Nielsen and Townsend, 2004). 
None of the monitoring studies conclusively detected transgene acquisitions in the genomes of 
the exposed bacterial populations. It should be emphasized that the approach used in these studies 
provides only a limited ability to detect rare bacterial transformants carrying the transgene. The 
probability that the analysis will reveal transformants is exceedingly low due to the high number 
of bacteria naturally present in the environments sampled, and also the high intrinsic background 
resistance to the antibiotics used to select bacteria carrying ARM genes. It has been estimated 
that all the field studies to date have examined HGT processes occurring in bacteria present in 
less than 2 g of combined sample material (Nielsen and Townsend, 2004). The sampling time has 
also been questioned in these studies, since it may take a prolonged period (weeks, years, or 
decades), for the transformants carrying ARM genes to reproduce to sufficient numbers to be 
detected by monitoring (Nielsen and Townsend, 2004).  
 
The many studies described above demonstrate that horizontal transfer of ARM genes can occur 
under highly optimised conditions and that no inherent barrier is present to prevent the process 
from occurring. Sampling limitations prevent HGT monitoring strategies from being efficiently 
applied to natural bacterial communities exposed to ARM genes.  
The ad hoc group is of the opinion that current studies demonstrate the potential for horizontal 
acquisitions of ARM genes in bacterial communities, and that further studies are necessary to 
determine the relevance of these experimental studies to natural GMO conditions. Further, that 
advances in sampling strategies and bacterial population genetics are necessary to enable 
informative monitoring of HGT processes occurring in natural bacterial populations exposed to 









Table 4. Studies performed to examine horizontal transfer of ARM or epsps genes 
into soil or gut bacteria.  
Transgenic plants Methods of detection Transfer detected Reference 
Tobacco plants 
grown in field sites 
in France  
Cultivation, DNA 
extraction, 
hybridization and PCR  
No Paget et al., 
1998 
Sugar beet plants 
grown in field sites 
in Germany  
Cultivation, DNA 
extraction, 
hybridization and PCR  
No Gebhard and 
Smalla, 1999 
Corn plants grown 




hybridization and PCR 




bean meal  
Cultivation, DNA 
extraction, 
hybridization and PCR 
Not during the 
investigations, although 
indications were found 
that transfer had 
occurred prior to the 
start of the study 
Netherwood 




3.3.3. Resistance mechanisms and the prevalence of ARM gene homologues in bacterial 
communities 
 
The assumption that there is a low risk of increased resistance development associated with using 
particular ARM genes has been based on the observed high prevalence of resistance traits in 
environmental bacteria (Kelch and Lee, 1978, Henschke and Schmidt, 1990). However, it is 
necessary to determine the genetic basis for the observed resistance in order to make these studies 
informative for biological risk assessment. Only a few peer-reviewed studies are available on the 
concentrations and the locations of resistance gene homologues to ARM genes in non-clinical 
environments (e.g. Leff et al., 1993, Smalla et al., 1993, 1997, van Elsas and Smalla, 1995, 
Aarestrup et al., 2000, Sandvang and Aarestrup, 2000, Seveno et al., 2002). In clinical settings, 
AR in bacteria are most often monitored and described by phenotype (NORM/NORMVET 2004) 
(see also Appendix). Therefore in most cases it is difficult to link an observed phenotypic 
resistance trait in a clinical isolate specifically with the occurrence of a particular AR gene.  
 
 
3.3.3.1. Aminoglycosides, resistance mechanisms and the prevalence of resistance genes 
 
Aminoglycosides constitute a large group of hydrophilic antibiotics, which include; amikacin, 
gentamicin, hygromycin, kanamycin, neomycin, netilmicin, paromomycin, streptomycin, and 
05/302-1-final 




tobramycin. These chemical compounds are products of actinomycetes (soil bacteria) or semi-
synthetic derivates of the natural products. Aminoglycosides are characterized by the presence of 
an aminocyclitol ring linked to amino-sugars in their structure. They are active against aerobic 
and facultative aerobic gram-negative bacteria and some gram-positive bacteria like 
staphylococci. Aminoglycosides are valuable antibiotics for the treatment and prophylaxis of 
various infections (Vakulenko and Mobashery, 2003). In Norway, some aminoglycosides are 
considered very important drugs in the empirical treatment of systemic bacterial infections, due 
to their broad-spectrum bactericidal effect and the low prevalence of aminoglycoside-resistance 
(NORM/NORM-VET 2004).  
 
Aminoglycoside resistance mechanisms. Aminoglycosides exert their effect by interfering with 
translational fidelity during protein synthesis, by interacting with the decoding region of the A-
site rRNA on the 16S domain of the ribosome (Moazed and Noller 1987). There are three known 
mechanisms of resistance against aminoglycosides; i) decreased intracellular concentration of the 
drug; ii) target modification; and iii) enzymatic drug modification (Magnet and Blanchard 2005). 
Transport defects or membrane impermeability have been reported in some aminoglycoside 
resistant strains of Pseudomonas aeruginosa and other gram-negative bacteria (Mingeot-Leclercq 
et al., 1999). Resistance to streptomycin can occur by target modification since the agent binds to 
a single site on the 30S subunit of the ribosome. This mechanism is not recognised as the reason 
for resistance to other aminoglycosides, since they bind to multiple sites on both ribosomal 
subunits, and therefore high-level resistance would not be selected by a single mutational step 
(Kucers et al., 1997). The most clinically important resistance mechanism is enzymatic drug 
modification. The genes encoding aminoglycoside-modifying enzymes can often be found on, 
and disseminated by, plasmids and transposons. Aminoglycoside-modifying enzymes catalyse 
the covalent-modification of specific amino or hydroxyl functions, resulting in a chemically 
modified drug that binds poorly to ribosomes and for which the energy dependent process (phase 
II) of accelerated drug uptake also fails to occur. This may frequently lead to high-level 
resistance (Davies and Wright 1997). More than 50 different aminoglycoside modifying enzymes 
have been identified, which are classified into three major classes (AAC, ANT, APH) according 
to the type of modification (Shaw et al., 1993). These genes are often found on mobile genetic 
elements such as transposons and plasmids (Derbise et al., 1997, Gibreel et al., 2004). It has been 
suggested that the enzymes are derived from microorganisms that make the aminoglycoside, or 
from the mutation of genes that encode enzymes involved in cellular respiration (Gilbert, 2000). 
The specific names of the enzymes discussed in relation to ARM genes are HPT = APH(4)-F 
(hygromycin resistance), NPTII = (APH3`)IIa (kanamycin resistance) and STR = ANT(3``)1a 
(streptomycin resistance).  
 
Prevalence of the nptII resistance gene (Group 1). Few studies are available to provide 
accurate information on the environmental distribution and copy numbers of the nptII gene in 
Europe. Most of the available peer-reviewed studies suggest a very low prevalence of nptII genes 
among bacteria in non-clinical environments (Leff et al., 1993, Smalla et al., 1993). The Leff et 
al. (1993) study was conducted in the USA. The only environmental study of nptII distribution in 
Europe, of which we are aware, was performed on a limited sample set from the Netherlands and 
Germany (Smalla et al., 1993, Gebhard and Smalla, 1999). In this study the nptII gene was not 
detected in soil, but was found in sewage and manure samples taken in the Netherlands and 
Germany. The nptII gene has been described as being rarely found in clinical isolates (Shaw et 
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al., 1993). We are not aware of any peer-reviewed studies that have described the environmental 
prevalence of nptII genes in Scandinavia. Unpublished studies (K. G. Berdal, pers. comm.). of 60 
imported feed samples tested in Norway by the National Veterinary Institute (routine surveillance 
requested by public authorities) in 2003 and 2004, 5% gave positive PCR amplification of nptII 
gene fragments and all the nptII fragment positive samples were also positive for several other 
antibiotic resistance genes by PCR analysis  
 
Knowledge of the level of phenotypic kanamycin resistance can provide some insight into the 
overall occurrence of resistance, although the genetic basis for the resistance trait remains 
unknown. In soil, phenotypic kanamycin resistance is widespread, with approx 105 resistant 
bacteria per gram of soil (Henschke and Schmidt, 1990, Smalla et al., 1993, Nielsen et al., 
2000b). In the USA, a low level of phenotypic kanamycin resistance has been reported in poultry 
litter (Kelley et al., 1998), and fresh water samples (Kelch and Lee, 1978). A study of the 
antibiotic resistance profiles of Campylobacter jejuni from wild birds in Sweden did not detect 
any isolates resistant to neomycin among 274 isolates (Waldenström et al., 2005), thus suggesting 
a low prevalence of the nptII gene in wild birds that are can be a reservoir of these 
enteropathogenic bacteria.  
 
In clinical settings, the highly variable usage of aminoglycosides results in variable degrees of 
phenotypic observable resistance between clinical strains, hospitals, and countries (Vakulenko 
and Mobashery, 2003) In the USA, the SENTRY surveillance programme reported that the 4 
most common gram-negative bacteria in bloodstream infections were susceptible to the 
aminoglycosides tested (Pfaller et al., 1998). Similarly, low levels of phenotypic resistance were 
found in European clinical isolates (Schmitz et al. 1999). A small increase in the aminoglycoside 
resistance patterns has been observed (see Vakulenko and Mobashery, 2003). A low prevalence 
of aminoglycoside resistance determinants mediating isolated resistance to kanamycin in 
Norwegian blood culture isolates of Staphylococcus epidermidis has been reported, suggesting a 
very low prevalence of the nptII gene among human clinical isolates in Norway (Klingenberg et 
al., 2004). The phenotypic resistance situation to kanamycin in Norway remains very low as 
documented in yearly surveillance reports (SNT Report 1998, 1999, Kruse 1999, 2000, Kruse 
and Schau 2001, Kruse and Skov Simonsen 2001, NORM/NORM-VET 2001, 2004) suggesting 
an even lower prevalence of the nptII gene.  
 
Although the prevalence of pathogenic and environmental bacterial isolates resistant to 
kanamycin in Norway is low, the data available suggests nptII gene copies are present in 
Norwegian environments and in feed sources. The data available does not facilitate precise 
estimates to be made of the copy numbers of the nptII gene in Norwegian environments.  
 
Prevalence of the hpt resistance gene (Group 1). We are not aware of any studies that have 
examined the environmental or clinical occurrence of the hpt gene.  
 
Prevalence of the str resistance gene (Group 2). Only a few studies are available on the 
environmental distribution of the str (ant(3``)1a) gene in Europe. One comprehensive study that 
sampled soil, the rhizosphere, manure, activated sludge and seawater from several European 
countries reported the presence of the ant(3``) gene in all the habitats examined, suggesting a 
widespread occurrence of this gene in various bacterial species and environments (van Overbeek 
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et al., 2002). The study of Campylobacter jejuni from wild birds in Sweden found no 
streptomycin resistant isolates among the 274 isolates examined (Waldenström et al., 2005), 
suggesting a low prevalence of the ant(3``)1a gene in these enteropathogenic bacteria. It is, 
however, difficult to estimate the total copy number of ant(3``)1 genes present in the various 
environments studied. We are not aware of any comprehensive studies on the prevalence of the 
various str genes in Norway. Thus, the occurrence in various environments and the bacterial 
species distribution of the ant(3``)1a gene in Norway is unknown, and it is possible that the 
situation in Norway may differ from that in other European countries due to variations in 
streptomycin usage. Nevertheless, as streptomycin has been commonly used in veterinary 
medicine in Norway for many years and as phenotypic streptomycin resistance is relatively 
frequently observed (NORM/NORM-VET, 2004), it is possible that the environmental 
distribution of the str gene in Norway is similar to the situation in Europe. 
 
 
3.3.3.2. Ampicillin, resistance mechanisms and the prevalence of resistance genes 
 
Ampicillin is an aminopenicillin, belonging to the family of β-lactam antibiotics. β-lactam 
antibiotics are one of the largest groups of commercially available antibiotics and include the 
penicillins and the cephalosporins, which have related structures and similar mechanisms of 
action. Ampicillin is considered a broad-spectrum penicillin and inhibits a set of transpeptidases 
that catalyse the final cross-linking reaction of peptidoglycan synthesis in bacteria. The loss of 
the stability conferred by the wall eventually leads to cell lysis. Ampicillin has been extensively 
used to treat bacterial infections including shigellosis (dysentery), gonorrhoea, meningitis, and 
streptococcal and staphylococcal infections since 1961. However, the increased prevalence of 
various betalactamase genes in human pathogens has significantly limited its clinical use to 
respiratory and urinary tract infections caused by betalactamase-negative, ampicillin susceptible 
bacteria confirmed by antimicrobial susceptibility analysis (see below).  
 
Ampicillin resistance mechanisms. High-level bacterial resistance to the β-lactams is primarily 
due to the hydrolysis of the antibiotic by a β-lactamase enzyme (Bush et al., 1995). A wide 
diversity of ampicillin resistance genes encoding β-lactamases has been described that belongs to 
various families such as TEM, SHV and CTX. TEM-1 is usually a plasmid encoded β-lactamase, 
commonly encountered in E. coli that inactivates narrow-spectrum cephalosporins, 
cephamandole, and cephoperazone, and all gram-negative active penicillins except temocillin. 
Importantly, many extended-spectrum β-lactamases (capable of hydrolysing extended spectrum 
cephalosporins) derive from simple point mutations in the TEM-1 allele. More than 140 such 
amino acid substitution variants of the TEM-1 allele have been described. The bla gene encoding 
TEM-1 β-lactamase is widely used as a selective marker conferring ampicillin-resistance in 
molecular biology studies and is present in the frequently-used pBR and pUC plasmids. Some of 
the pUC cloning plasmids have also been inserted into plants, for instance in the development of 
GM insect-resistant maize, including event Bt176 (Malik and Saroha 1999). 
 
Prevalence of the blaTEM-1 resistance gene (Group 2). The environmental prevalence of blaTEM-1 
alleles is presently mostly unexplored. Unpublished studies suggest that their prevalence may be 
very low, and is below the limit of detection in the intestines of seals, polar bears, and in soil 
samples taken from Arctic regions (T. Glad, K. M. Nielsen, unpublished). Similar low levels 
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have been noted in various agricultural soil samples from New Zealand (P. Myren, P. Carter, K. 
M. Nielsen, unpublished). However, PCR positive signals for blaTEM genes have been detected in 
a commercially sold compost soil in Italy (L. Brusetti, D. Daffonchio, K. M. Nielsen, 
unpublished).  
 
The clinical prevalence of blaTEM-1 is likely to vary between clinical strains, hospitals, and 
countries. Most ampicillin-resistant (AmpR) clinical isolates of E. coli harbor the TEM-1 allele 
(Livermore, 1995, and Sundsfjord A, unpublished). The prevalence of ampicillin-resistance in 
blood culture isolates of E. coli in various European countries ranges between 25 and 65 % 
(EARSS, 2002). This level of ampicillin-resistance also reflects the prevalence of AmpR in 
uropahogenic E. coli, thus limiting the usefulness of ampicillin in the empirical treatment of 
urinary tract infections as well as in septicaemia. The prevalence of resistance in clinical strains is 
consistent with the observed occurrence of 23 % of faecal E. coli strains from healthy humans in 
Denmark demonstrating ampicillin-resistance (DANMAP 2004). Clinical studies of E. coli and 
other enterobacterial isolates suggest that the blaTEM-1 gene is present in >20 % of isolates from 
the intestinal system of humans in Norway (A. Sundsfjord, pers. comm.). The emergence and 
spread of β-lactamases within Staphylococcus aureus and E. coli, the two most prevalent 
bacterial species in blood culture specimens, has significantly reduced the clinical usefulness of 
ampicillin during the last 10 years.  The blaTEM-1 gene seems to be the major determinant encoding 
ampicillin-resistance in E. coli, whereas the blaZ gene dominates among staphylococci. However, 
a leading expert on blaTEM genes Prof. P. Courvalin states that although the blaTEM-1 allele is 
prevalent in E. coli, it is currently not ubiquitous amongst commonly encountered bacteria that 
are pathogenic to man; i.e. streptococci, enterococci, Neisseria spp., and Haemophilus influenzae 
(Courvalin, 1998). As a consequence, antibiotics to which blaTEM-1 confers resistance are still 
among the most sold antibiotics in the world. Therefore, whereas the blaTEM-1 gene may be 
prevalent in some previously susceptible species, the current geographical occurrence and species 
distribution of resistance is not hindering the continued clinical use of ampicillin, and related 
derivatives, for treatment of infections. The Norwegian surveillance system for antibiotic 
resistance in human medicine (NORM) have shown that blaTEM-mediated ampicillin resistance is 
encountered in 30 % and 6 % of clinical isolates of E. coli and H. influenzae, respectively 
(NORM/NORM-VET 2001, 2003). The current prevalence of blaTEM-mediated ampicillin 
resistance in Neisseria gonorrhoea is not available. In 2002, 3% of 120 E. coli isolates from 
faecal samples from 120 cattle were ampicillin resistant, whereas only 0.8% of 118 E. coli 
isolates from faecal samples from 118 sheep were ampicillin resistant (NORM/NORM-VET 
2001, 2003). Ampicillin is sometimes used therapeutically in cattle and sheep in Norway. Of the 
sheep included in this study, 70% were lambs slaughtered at about 6 months of age. Lamb 
production in Norway is extensive, and the lambs spend a large part of their lives roaming freely 
on rough, upland grazing. Another survey in 2002 showed that none of 42 E. coli isolates from 
faecal samples from 42 reindeer in Norway were ampicillin resistant. These data further 
demonstrate a low environmental occurrence of ampicillin-resistance in Norway. 
 
 
3.3.3.3. Chloramphenicol, resistance mechanisms and the prevalence of resistance genes 
 
Chloramphenicol was originally isolated from Streptomyces venezuelae and is now synthetically-
produced. The compound mainly exerts a bacteriostatic effect on a wide range of gram-positive 
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and gram-negative organisms (Schwarz et al., 2004). In addition, it is active against Rickettsia, 
Chlamydia (psittacosis-lymphogranuloma), and Mycoplasma (Shaw, 1983). Chloramphenicol is 
now very seldom used for systemic treatment of bacterial infections, however, it is often used for 
the empirical topical treatment of bacterial conjunctivitis. Chloramphenicol acts by binding to the 
50S ribosomal subunit and blocking the formation of the peptide bond by inhibiting peptidyl 
transferase activity and inhibiting protein synthesis (Schlunzen et al., 2001). It is a potent 
inhibitor of mitochondrial protein synthesis in eukaryotic cells.  
 
Chloramphenicol resistance mechanisms. Resistance against chloramphenicol in bacteria is 
mainly due to enzymatic inactivation. Resistance to chloramphenicol is conferred by the cat gene, 
which encodes for the enzyme chloramphenicol acetyltransferase (Murray and Shaw 1997). 
There are also reports of other mechanisms of chloramphenicol resistance, such as efflux 
systems, inactivation by phosphotransferases, mutation of target sites and permeability barriers 
(Shaw et al., 1993). 
 
Prevalence of the cat resistance gene (Group 2). We are not aware of studies that have 
examined the clinical or environmental prevalence of the cat gene in Norway or Europe. The 
study of the antibiotic resistance profiles of Campylobacter jejuni from wild birds in Sweden 
found no chloramphenicol resistant isolates among the 274 isolates (Waldenström et al., 2005), 
suggesting a low prevalence of the cat gene in these enteropathogenic bacteria. In Norway in 
2002, 0.8% of 120 E. coli isolates from faecal samples from 120 cattle were chloramphenicol 
resistant, whereas none of 118 E. coli isolates from faecal samples from 118 sheep were 
chloramphenicol resistant (NORM/NORM-VET 2001, 2003). A survey conducted in Norway in 
2002, showed that none of 42 E. coli isolates from faecal samples from 42 reindeer were 
chloramhenicol resistant (NORM/NORM-VET, 2002). These data demonstrate a low 
environmental occurrence of chloramhenicol-resistance in Norway. It should be noted that 




3.3.4 Identification of selective conditions favouring bacteria harbouring ARM genes 
 
In order for rare bacterial transformants, carrying acquired ARM genes, to outnumber and 
establish in a larger bacterial population, positive selection is usually required (Nielsen and 
Townsend, 2001, 2004). It should be noted that today’s clinical problem of AR is most often not 
the direct result of high transfer frequencies of resistance genes in clinical environments and, 
hence, high numbers of first generation of clinically troublesome resistant bacteria. More often, 
the resistance problems only arise after the selective amplification of bacterial populations 
harbouring the acquired resistance determinant, which have descended from the original bacterial 
cell that acquired the trait. Identification of those selective conditions and the quantification of 
the growth dynamics of bacteria harbouring ARM genes are thus required in order to understand 
the potential for rapid amplification of bacteria carrying newly-acquired resistance traits. 
Unfortunately, our current understanding of selection in complex natural environments is limited; 
the data are sporadic and quantification is exceedingly difficult (Recorbet et al., 1992, van Elsas, 
1992, Wellington et al., 1993, Oliveira et al., 1995). Nevertheless, information on the distribution 
and usage patterns of pharmaceutically-produced antibiotics allows the identification of 
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environments where strong positive selection of resistance carrying bacteria is likely to occur. 
The annual NORM/NORM-VET report (NORM/NORM-VET, 2004) provides an overview of 
the current usage of antibiotics in Norway. As seen in Table 5, in Norway neomycin, ampicillin, 
streptomycin and chloramphenicol are used in human medicine, and neomycin, streptomycin, and 
penicillin are used in veterinary medicine. Thus, with the exception of hygromycin, all the ARM 
genes categorised as belonging to either Group 1 or Group 2 by the EFSA opinion (EFSA, 2004) 
encode resistance to compounds used therapeutically in Norway. An increase in the resistance 
level to these antibiotics will therefore necessarily have an effect on antibiotic usage patterns and 
infection treatment efficiency.  
 
 
Table 5. Total sales of relevant antibiotics for human and veterinary 
medicine in 2004 in Norway (in kg of active substance)
A
.   
Antibiotics Human Veterinary 
Group 1   




Benzylpenicillin ? 1991 
Ampicillin 320 - 
Amoxicillin ? 202 





Chloramphenicol 30 -B 
A(NORM-NORMVET, 2004), excluding aquaculture. 
B111 kg of florfenicol was used therapeutically for farmed fish.  
 
 
The ad hoc group is not aware of comparable comprehensive data sets on the use of these 
antibiotics in the EU. Unfortunately, data on the use of antibiotics are not generally available for 
most EU countries and large variation in non-hospital usage of antibiotics across Europe, and in 
the classes of antibiotics used, has also been reported (Cars et al., 2001). This information reveals 
that there are clear knowledge gaps on the actual European usage of antibiotics relevant to the 
ARM genes that have been classified into Groups 1 and 2. It can, however, be inferred from the 
Cars et al. (2001) study, that most European countries have an overall higher usage than Norway 
of the specific ARM gene relevant antibiotics as listed in Table 5. For instance, Nap et al. (1992) 
estimate that 30 tons of neomycin and kanamycin is used annually in Dutch agriculture. The 
DANMAP report (DANMAP, 2004) shows that 11 675 kg of aminoglycosides, 317 kg of 
amphenicols, 20 950 kg of β-lactamase sensitive penicillins are used annually for veterinary 
purposes in Denmark. The SVARM report (SVARM 2004) quantifies the annual Swedish use of 
antimicrobial drugs for veterinary purposes as penicillins and aminopenicillins 8689 kg, and 
aminoglycosides 606 kg. Interestingly, the review by Nap et al. (1992) provides calculations that 
do not exclude the possibility that the concentration of these aminoglycoside antibiotics may 
reach selective levels beyond their intended destination, e.g. in soil. Thus, selective conditions for 
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ARM gene carrying bacteria can possibly be found beyond clinical and veterinary treatment 
settings. Halling-Sørensen et al. (1998) provide an extensive review of pharmaceutical substances 
found in various environments.  
 
The ad hoc group considers that given the documented usage of antibiotics in Norway, the 
positive selection of bacteria carrying ARM genes (and naturally-occurring gene homologues) 
may occur under certain conditions. This potential amplification of ARM genes in bacteria must 
be seen in relation to the exposure (levels and locations) of bacteria to naturally-occurring ARM 
gene homologues under the same conditions.  
 
 
3.3.5. Conclusions from section 3.3 
 
Based on the available data from experimental studies, horizontal transfer of ARM genes is likely 
to be an infrequent event and relies on the presence of stretches of similarity between the 
transferred DNA (containing the ARM gene) and the DNA of the bacterial recipient. No clear 
quantitative value exists to relate relevant frequencies to potential environmental impact. Thus, 
frequencies are of little predictive value in our assessment, particularly since the relevant 
frequencies may be well below that which can be measured in the laboratory or the field 
(Heinemann et al., 2004, Nielsen and Townsend, 2004). The impact of any rare bacterial 
acquisitions of ARM genes must be considered in relation to the potential for those bacterial 
transformants to be amplified selectively in the larger bacterial population. Moreover, the HGT 
rate of ARM genes must be considered in relation to the exposure rate and HGT rate to bacteria 
of naturally occurring homologues to the ARM genes. Addressing the range, quality and 
consensus between studies forming the basis of our knowledge of natural reservoirs of ARM 
gene homologues, and the knowledge of ARM gene selective conditions, is therefore essential in 
our assessment.  
 
 Group 1. For the Group 1 gene nptII, the ad hoc group considers that available data 
suggests the occurrence of this gene in pathogenic bacteria in Norway to be low. Veterinary 
usage of aminoglycosides such as neomycin in Europe, including Norway, may create selective 
conditions for bacterial transformants harbouring ARM genes. The nptII genes present in GMOs 
are generally regarded as not being a significant source of AR genes in comparison to the nptII 
genes already present in bacterial communities. However, in the absence of a quantitative 
understanding of the copy numbers of ARM genes naturally present in antibiotic-exposed 
environments, it is difficult to estimate the relative contribution of ARM genes to the total copy 
number of homologous AR genes in the environment. Further information on the natural 
occurrence of the nptII gene (i.e. relative copy numbers) in relevant Norwegian environments is 
necessary to provide a quantitative assessment of the possible effects of introducing the nptII 
gene as an ARM to Norway.  Little information is available on the distribution and ecology of the 
hpt gene. However, due to the limited clinical and veterinary importance of this gene, the ad hoc 
group has not identified specific concerns on the use of this gene as an ARM.  
 
 Group 2. The blaTEM-1 gene and the str gene appear to have a broad distribution in clinical 
settings throughout Europe, including Norway. However, the species and environmental 
distribution, and animal reservoirs, for the blaTEM-1 gene are limited. Arguably, the additional 
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introduction of these genes in an ARM context may provide only a limited contribution to the 
overall gene prevalence (copy numbers) of these genes in humans in Norway. Less information is 
available on the cat gene distribution. The antibiotics to which the blaTEM-1 gene and the str gene 
confer resistance are widely used for the treatment of infections in clinical and veterinary 
medicine in Norway (NORM/NORM-VET, 2004). The broad usage and utility of these 
antibiotics suggests caution should be applied in the dissemination of the corresponding 
resistance genes in environments that are selective for bacterial transformants carrying ARM 
genes.  
 
The ad hoc group finds that the lack of quantitative data on the copy numbers of naturally-
occurring ARM gene homologues present in various environments makes it difficult to assess the 




4. Overall assessment 
 
ARM genes are originally isolated from naturally occurring bacteria present in species-diverse 
microbial communities. Thus, microorganisms in environmental, commensal and clinical 
environments are naturally exposed to such resistance genes at variable levels. Moreover, 
bacteria are known to transfer AR genes frequently between cells and species (Derbise et al., 
1997, Gibreel et al., 2004). AR genes are known to occupy a range of genomic locations in 
various microorganisms making them some of the most dynamic genetic entities known. 
Mammalian exposure to ARM genes should be seen in relation to the daily exposure to a huge 
diversity of genes that mammals normally experience, both from ingested food, and also from 
intestinal bacteria.  
 
The large-scale release of GMOs containing ARM genes may thus not necessarily introduce new 
AR genes into a particular environment. However, the GMO introduction may change the 
environmental persistence and concentrations, of resistance genes and alter the dynamics of their 
exposure to various microorganisms. Moreover, the insertion of ARM genes into eukaryotic 
chromosomes in GMOs will necessarily alter the genomic locations of ARM genes substantially 
from those locations AR genes usually occupy in prokaryotic genomes. The changed genomic 
insertion sites and regulatory sequences may produce novel ARM gene expression patterns, 
epigenetic effects and may introduce post-translational modifications of the active enzymes. The 
effects of such changes, some of which are only hypothetical, are addressed in the risk 
assessment of GMOs intended for commercial use in Europe (EFSA, 2004).  
Based on the available information, the ad hoc group has reached the following assessment:  
 
Potential direct effects of ARM proteins and genes on mammals. There is a only a limited 
number of publicly available peer-reviewed experimental studies on the potential toxic, allergenic 
or other effects on mammalian cells of ARM-encoded proteins or ARM genes. The conclusions 
advocated here of a low risk produced by mammalian exposure to ARM gene encoded enzymes 
or ARM genes are mainly based on inference from the lack of observable effects from human 
exposure to naturally occurring counterparts of the ARM gene encoded proteins or ARM gene 
homologues. Although the natural concentrations of these resistance-producing enzymes or genes 
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are often unknown, consequences from natural exposure of mammals to these enzymes or genes 
have, to the extent investigated, not been reported.  
From the published studies on the uptake and tissue distribution of food-derived DNA in several 
mammalian species, it can be assumed that humans will infrequently take up intact ARM genes 
present in food from the intestinal tract into the bloodstream. The lack of a detailed understanding 
of the uptake mechanisms, transport pathways and degradation dynamics of food-derived DNA 
in the bloodstream of mammals represents a major knowledge gap that warrants further research. 
Moreover, the lack of quantitative data on DNA fragment size makes precise predictions of 
exposure rates of intestinal host cells to DNA and the relevant physical locations of DNA 
impossible. The possible interactions of ARM gene encoded proteins and their enzymatic activity 
with other proteins (proteome) in mammalian cytoplasms remains unexplored and should be 
further clarified. There are, however, no indications in the scientific literature suggesting ARM 
genes will produce negative effects if accidentally present in mammalian cell cytoplasm.  
 
Potential indirect health effects of ARM genes on mammals. Some of the ARM genes in 
Groups 1 and 2 encode resistance to antibiotics that are used therapeutically in human and 
veterinary medicine (Kruse and Jansson, 1997, EFSA, 2004). It is possible that pathogenic 
bacteria exposed to GMOs may infrequently acquire ARM genes that may ultimately lead to a 
reduction in the number of compounds available to treat bacterial infections in humans, plants 
and animals. A number of recent experimental studies show that ARM genes can be horizontally 
acquired by bacteria under optimised conditions (See table 4). Unfortunately, frequencies alone 
cannot be used to predict the long-term effects of sporadic gene transfer events. The relevance, 
sites and clinical effects of rare ARM gene transfer events should be seen in relation to the 
frequencies in which parallel AR gene acquisitions occur in bacteria from gene sources other than 
GMOs. A hypothetical negative outcome of the large-scale usage of ARM genes in GMOs 
includes significant alterations in genomic context, concentration levels and exposure routes of 
antibiotic resistance genes to relevant pathogens, thus increasing their potential to respond to 
antibiotic exposure by utilizing horizontally acquired genes. Knowledge of the natural exposure 
rates of bacterial communities to ARM gene homologues and selective compounds is essential in 
order to understand the comparative risk from ARM gene usage in GMOs. Some data are 
available on phenotypic and genotypic resistance distributions among selected environmental 
samples and clinical isolates in various locations across Europe. However, no systematic studies 
are available that estimate the copy numbers of the different ARM gene homologues in various 
environments. Without a clear understanding of the ARM gene copy number released in various 
GMOs, and the copy numbers of the corresponding naturally-occurring AR genes, it is difficult to 
estimate the relative contribution of ARM genes in GMOs to the overall exposure of bacteria to 
AR genes. Current understanding of resistance development in pathogenic bacteria does not 
allow an accurate prediction to be made on the effect of introducing new sources of resistance 
genes at various concentrations and locations.  
 
As outlined in the EFSA opinion (2004), two criteria can be adopted to approximate and 
supplement the lack of a direct predictive capability. These two criteria are 1) identification of the 
current natural reservoirs of resistance genes (section 3.3.3); and 2) identification of selective 
conditions favouring bacteria acquiring ARM genes (section 3.3.4). These assist in assessing the 
possible relative contribution of the ARM gene release from GMOs to the overall AR gene 
reservoir, and determining whether rare bacterial transformants that have acquired ARM genes 
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are likely to undergo directional selection and amplification leading to clinically significant 
populations. Unfortunately, it is unclear how the EFSA opinion and assessment quantitatively 
define the prevalence of the genes in relation to the group categorization and assessments made, 
and it is also unclear if the prevalence argument is based on considerations of the ARM copy 
number only, or if the relative presence of ARM gene homologues among relevant clinical 
isolates in different countries is considered too.  
 
Our literature survey and expert consultation suggests that the Group 1 gene nptII is only 
infrequently found in natural and clinical environments in Norway. Higher levels of the gene 
have been found in manure and sewage in a limited number of samples from the Netherlands and 
Germany. However, since the past and present agricultural usage of antibiotics varies 
considerably between countries, these observations need to be extended to Norwegian 
environments. Given the low level of phenotypic resistance to neomycin and kanamycin in 
pathogenic bacteria in Norway, more information is needed on the nptII gene prevalence (i.e. 
relative copy number considerations) in relevant Norwegian environments.   
Little information is available on the distribution and ecology of the hpt gene. However, due to 
the limited clinical and veterinary importance of this gene, the ad hoc group has not identified 
any specific concerns on the usage of this gene as an ARM. 
 
The blaTEM-1 allele is unlikely to be present at high concentrations in natural environments in 
Norway. However, clinical studies of E. coli and other enterobacterial isolates suggest that the 
blaTEM-1 gene is present in considerable quantities in the intestinal system of humans. Despite the 
apparently high prevalence of this gene among bacteria that are widely distributed in 
anthropogenic environments, the antibiotics to which the blaTEM-1 gene confers resistance remain 
some of the most widely used in the world. This suggests the resistance gene has a narrow 
species distribution and is present within these host bacterial populations at high proportions. 
Thus, there is no clear link between the high prevalence of resistance genes in defined species 
and environments, and the potential for rapid dissemination to other sensitive species during 
clinical ampicillin-treatment.  
The str gene seems to have a broad distribution among various habitats in Europe, although copy 
number estimates are rarely provided.  
Little information is available on the cat gene distribution among species and environments in 
Europe.  
 
The antibiotics to which the blaTEM-1 gene and the str gene confer resistance are widely used in 
clinical and veterinary treatment of infections in Europe, including Norway (NORM/NORM-
VET, 2004). The broad usage and utility of these antibiotics, combined with the observation of 
emerging ampicillin resistance in previously susceptible species, suggests caution should be 
applied in the dissemination of resistance genes in environments that are selective for bacterial 
transformants carrying specific ARM genes.  
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5. Uncertainty in the assessment and some identified knowledge gaps 
 
Uncertainty and divergence in opinion is a natural part of the scientific process, and is 
particularly apparent in the application of novel technologies. Most risk assessments for novel 
technology applications pinpoint knowledge gaps and generate a number of questions, some with 
no clear scientific answers or public consensus. This is also the case in assessing the risks 
associated with the introduction of ARM genes as selectable markers in GMOs.  
 
A variety of assumption-based reasoning and information sources have been used in the 
biological risk assessment of ARM genes to resolve some of the questions raised. The basis for 
the assumptions made and the information sources include, i) direct test results submitted by the 
GMO developers; ii) experimental data available in the peer-reviewed literature; iii) published 
and/or communicated historical and comparative experiences and observations of similar 
biological systems; and iv) submitted or conducted expert evaluations of the outcomes of 
conceived worst case scenarios.  
 
The robustness, nature and quality of the assumptions made and the information sources available 
can lead to contested outcomes of the risk assessment. The scientific strength and, hence, social 
robustness, of any risk assessment depends on how the uncertainties embedded in the prevailing 
paradigms are identified, addressed and communicated. The level of uncertainties related to the 
biological risk assessment can be divided into various categories ranging from statistical 
uncertainty to total ignorance (Strand, 2001, Walker et al., 2003). The overall concept of 
uncertainty is also defined by its location and nature (Walker et al., 2003). Uncertainty related to 
the location includes the problem framing and model context, model use, interpretation and 
relevant parameters. The nature of the uncertainty relates to the distinction between epistemic 
uncertainty that can be reduced with more research, and variability uncertainty due to inherent 
stochasticity within the system that cannot be fully resolved with empirical efforts.  
It is important that regulatory bodies recognize, address and transparently communicate how they 
deal with the uncertainty inherent in the process of biological risk assessment. Regulatory bodies 
often operate to strict deadlines and must therefore act with the information on hand, since 
limited time and resources rarely allow extensive experimental investigations to be initiated to 
support the assumptions made or conclusions drawn. This is also the case for our assessment of 
the ARM genes.  
 
In the present assessment of the ARM marker genes, the ad hoc group notes that most of the 
assessment is based on comparative experience and inference from the natural presence of ARM 
gene homologues, rather than on direct experimental or epidemiological verification of the 
absence of negative effects. The inference from lack of observable effects from human or 
environmental exposure to natural counterparts of ARM gene homologues forms the baseline for 
our assumptions of no direct biological effect of ARM genes in humans or the environment. In 
our assessment of the indirect effects of ARM genes, we identify many areas with clear 
uncertainty that relates to the location (HGT context, HGT model application, HGT parameters, 
and model outcomes, population dynamics) and nature (the extent of epistemic versus inherent 
variability in HGT processes and outcomes). While acknowledging the larger perspective on 
uncertainty in our assessment of the ARM genes, the ad hoc group has identified a number of 
reducible uncertainties and knowledge gaps in the assessment of the biological effects of ARM 
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5.1. Uncertainty and knowledge gaps in the effects caused by human exposure to proteins 
encoded by ARM genes 
 
The limited number of experimental studies available to resolve questions regarding the 
biological effects of human exposure to ARM gene encoded proteins results in an assessment that 
is based mainly on comparative experience and inference, rather than on direct experimental or 
epidemiological verification of the absence of effects. Some knowledge gaps identified include:  
 
• With the possible exception of the NPTII protein, very little experimental evidence is 
available on the acute toxicity, allergenicity, or environmental stability of any protein 
conferring antibiotic resistance. 
• Little experimental evidence is available to clarify the degradation kinetics or 
enzymatic activity of food-ingested proteins conferring antibiotic resistance.  
• It is unclear how adequate current bioinformatics-based methodology is at assessing 
and predicting the allergenic potential of ARM gene products. 
• It is unclear how adequately experimental investigations using purified ARM gene 
encoded proteins reflect the biological processes encountered by ARM gene encoded 
proteins present in foods with complex compositions.  
 
These knowledge gaps can be categorized to the level and location of the uncertainty. The level 
of uncertainty reflects divergence in the conceptual understanding of the range of relevant 
biological effects caused by ARM gene encoded proteins exposed to mammalian cells. The 
location of uncertainty relates to divergence in the understanding of, and application of, models, 
methods and parameters to assess the pathways of the proteins in the GIT of mammals.  
 
The ad hoc group is of the opinion that further developments in methodology, and 
standardization of methodology, should be encouraged to reduce uncertainty and strengthen the 




5.2 Uncertainty and knowledge gaps in the effects caused by human exposure to, or uptake 
of, intact ARM genes 
 
Only a limited number of experimental studies are available to resolve questions related to direct 
human exposure to ARM genes. Some knowledge gaps identified include: 
 
• There is a lack of a detailed understanding of uptake mechanisms, transport pathways 
and degradation mechanisms and dynamics of food-derived DNA in the intestinal 
cells and bloodstream of mammals. 
• There is a lack of quantitative data on DNA exposure rates and fragment size 
distribution in the digestive system of various mammals digesting various foods.  
• The extent to which ARM genes are taken up and transcribed in mammalian cell 
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cytoplasms is unclear.  
• The proportion of food-derived ARM genes taken up into the bloodstream of 
mammals, and to what extent these will be transcribed if further transferred into host 
cells, is unclear.  
• The effects of the enzymatic activity of ARM proteins in the cells of the GMO and in 
exposed mammalian cells needs to be further clarified.  
• There is a lack of sensitive methodology and suitable model systems to address 
adequately the fate, and possible biological effects, of feed-derived genes, including 
ARM genes entering the bloodstream of mammals.  
• There is a lack of demographic data on the relative exposure rates of mammalian cells 
to AR genes from bacteria naturally present in the GIT or in food, as compared to the 
exposure to ARM genes present in the genome of GMOs.  
 
These knowledge gaps can be categorized to the level and location of the uncertainty. The level 
of uncertainty relates to divergence in the paradigms explaining the biological pathways and 
effects caused of ARM genes exposed to various mammalian cells. The location of uncertainty 
relates to the divergence in the understanding and application of models, methods and parameters 
used to assess the pathways of the ARM genes in the GIT and bloodstream of mammals.  
 
The ad hoc group is of the opinion that further developments in the basic understanding of the 
pathways, distribution and degradation dynamics of all feed-derived DNA is necessary in order to 
strengthen the biological risk assessment of potential unintended effects caused by novel genes 




5.3 Uncertainty and knowledge gaps in the effects of horizontal transfer of ARM genes to 
bacteria 
 
Some experimental studies are available to resolve questions related to the indirect effects of 
ARM genes on human health after HGT to bacteria. Results from these experiments, together 
with comparative experience and inference, form the basis for our assessment of an HGT 
scenario. Experimental laboratory and field investigations suggest horizontal transfers of ARM 
genes from plants to bacteria are rare events. However, the experimental design of these studies 
has been questioned and, overall, our understanding of AR development in bacteria is currently 
more descriptive than predictive. The number of peer-reviewed studies on the in situ detection of 
natural transformation is limited, possibly indicating that the process occurs at very low 
frequencies under natural conditions. Alternatively, it has been suggested that valid conclusions 
cannot be drawn about the in situ activity of the process due to the lack of both adequate 
experimental design and sufficiently sensitive methodology (Heinemann et al., 2004, Nielsen and 
Townsend, 2004). Various knowledge gaps have been identified that relate to the potential 
indirect negative effects of unintended ARM gene transfer to bacteria:  
 
• The proportion of intact ARM genes that are released from the cytoplasm of GMOs in 
various environments needs to be experimentally determined and a quantitative 
understanding of the degradation kinetics developed.  
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• The distribution, and tempo-spatial development, of competence for natural 
transformation must be determined in bacteria present in environments where ARM 
gene exposure occurs, and the factors governing the uptake of foreign DNA into 
bacteria should be further clarified. Studies of HGT processes in the GIT are of 
particular relevance.  
• The concentration (copy numbers) of ARM gene homologues in natural 
environments, including the GIT of various mammals needs to be determined in order 
to generate a comparative understanding of the ecological importance of ARM gene 
donors.  
• Antibiotic usage patterns need to be The factors determining the population dynamics 
of bacterial populations need to be identified and quantified in order to determine the 
possible biological significance, and relevant frequencies, of generating bacterial 
transformants carrying ARM genes.  
• Further development of relevant biological model systems is necessary to resolve 
experimentally the possible occurrence of HGT of ARM genes into bacteria under 
representative environmental conditions.  
• made publicly available to aid the identification of potentially selective environments 
for bacteria carrying ARM genes.  
 
These knowledge gaps can be categorized to the level and location of the uncertainty. The level 
of uncertainty relates to divergence in the understanding of the ecological significance of the 
release, bacterial exposure, and uptake of ARM genes. The location of uncertainty relates to the 
divergence in the understanding and application of relevant models, methods and parameters used 
to assess the pathways of the ARM genes in various environmental sites. Moreover, there is a 
lack of quantitative data, and this generates uncertainty related to the occurrence of ARM gene 
homologues in the environment and the usage levels of relevant antibiotics in Europe.  
 
The ad hoc group is of the opinion that further developments in the basic understanding of the 
molecular and population scale aspects of HGT processes in bacteria are necessary to strengthen 
the risk assessment of potential unintended effects caused by ARM genes in GMOs. Furthermore, 
experimental and epidemiological data are needed on the distribution of ARM gene homologues, 










The ARM genes used in GMOs are isolated from naturally occurring bacteria, thus a natural 
reservoir of these genes exists and any new introductions of AR genes through the release and 
use of GMOs must be seen in relation to the existing levels and locations in which AR genes 
reside naturally.  
 
The limited number of experimental studies available to resolve the biological uncertainties 
arising from ARM gene introductions results in an assessment that is based mainly on 
comparative experience and inference, rather than on direct experimental or epidemiological 
verification of the absence of negative effects.   
Most of the assumptions of a low risk produced by the release and exposure to ARM gene 
encoded proteins are based on inference from lack of observable effects from human and 
environmental exposure to naturally occurring counterparts to the ARM gene encoded proteins. 
Although the natural concentration of these resistance enzymes is often unknown, unintended 
consequences from natural exposure to these enzymes have not been reported. Thus, the ad hoc 
group has not identified any particular risk of Group 1 ARM gene encoded proteins in Norway. 
Due to the highly limited release of Group 2 ARM gene encoded proteins expected in Norway, 
the ad hoc group does not consider that the limited release of these proteins constitutes a health 
or environmental risk. 
 
There are a number of knowledge gaps related to the uptake mechanisms, transport pathways and 
degradation dynamics of food-derived DNA in the bloodstream of mammals, and a lack of 
quantitative data on the degradation of DNA in different mammals digesting various sources of 
food. While acknowledging the lack of knowledge on these processes, the ad hoc group is of the 
opinion that mammalian exposure to ARM genes should be seen in relation to the daily exposure 
to a huge variety of genes (DNA) that mammals normally experience from any ingested food. 
The ad hoc group is not aware of any experimental evidence that suggests that ARM genes will 
produce negative effects if unintentionally taken up into, or produced in, mammalian cell 
cytoplasm. However, the possible interactions of ARM gene encoded proteins and their 
enzymatic activity with other proteins (proteome) in mammalian cytoplasms remains unexplored 
and should be further clarified. The ad hoc group has not identified any particular risks of the 
considered ARM genes, when examining the mammalian cell or cytoplasm exposure to feed-
derived DNA containing ARM genes. 
 
Some experimental studies are available to resolve questions related to the indirect effects of 
ARM genes on human health after HGT to bacteria. These experiments, together with 
comparative experience and inference from clinical resistance development, form the basis for 
our assessment of this scenario. Experimental laboratory and field investigations suggest HGT of 
ARM genes from plants to bacteria is rare. However, the experimental design of these studies 
have been questioned and, overall, our understanding of antibiotic resistance development in 
bacteria is currently more retrospective and descriptive, than predictive. Various knowledge gaps 
have been identified that relate to the process and outcomes of unintended ARM gene transfer to 
bacteria. Our current understanding of the release, stability and bacterial uptake of free DNA 
does not exclude the possibility that ARM genes can be exposed to competent bacteria, and may 
be acquired, at very low frequencies, by bacteria present in fields, food, and the digestive system 
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of mammals. Frequency estimates are, however, of limited utility to predict the long-term effect 
of sporadic gene transfer events. Knowledge of the selective conditions for rare bacterial 
transformants is necessary in order to predict the ecological and clinical outcomes of rare HGT 
events. Our current understanding of resistance development in pathogenic bacteria does not 
allow us to predict accurately the effect of introducing new sources of AR genes at various 
concentrations and locations. 
 
As outlined in the EFSA opinion (2004), two criteria can be adopted to approximate and 
supplement the lack of a direct predictive capability. These are, 1) identification of the current 
natural reservoirs of resistance genes (section 3.3.3); and 2) identification of selective conditions 
favouring bacteria acquiring ARM genes (section 3.3.4). These assist in assessing the possible 
relative contribution of the ARM gene release from GMOs to the overall AR gene reservoir, and 
determining whether rare bacterial transformants that have acquired ARM genes are likely to 
undergo directional selection and amplification leading to clinically significant populations. 
Without a clear understanding of the ARM gene copy number released in various GMOs, and the 
corresponding copy numbers of naturally-occurring AR genes, it is difficult to estimate the 
relative contribution of ARM genes in GMOs to the overall AR gene exposure to bacteria. 
 
Some data are available on phenotypic and genotypic resistance distributions among selected 
environmental samples and clinical isolates in various locations across Europe. However, no 
systematic studies are available that estimate the copy numbers of the various ARM gene 
homologues in various environments.  
 
 
 Group 1. Our literature survey identifies only few studies on the environmental distribution 
of the nptII gene. The limited data available suggests that the Group 1 gene nptII is only present 
in some natural and clinical bacterial isolates in Norway. The gene has been found in manure and 
sewage in a limited number of samples from the Netherlands and Germany. However, since the 
past and present agricultural usage of antibiotics varies considerably between countries, these 
observations need to be extended to Norwegian environments. The current usage pattern of 
aminoglycoside antibiotics in Norway and the low level of phenotypic resistance to 
aminoglycosides in pathogenic bacteria seen in Norway suggest caution should be applied in 
introducing new sources of resistance genes.  
Little information is available on the distribution and ecology of the hpt gene, however, due to 
the limited clinical and veterinary importance of this gene, the ad hoc group has not identified 
specific concerns on the usage of this gene as an ARM. The ad hoc group is of the opinion that 
an increase in the prevalence of the hpt-gene will constitute a minimal risk, in agreement with 
EFSA’s opinion.  
 
The ad hoc group is of the opinion that an increase in the environmental exposure of the nptII-
gene might constitute a somewhat larger risk than what is the case of the hpt-gene. The risk is 
nevertheless regarded as low. The reasoning for this view is that the ad hoc group considers that 
available data suggests the occurrence of this gene in pathogenic bacterial species in Norway to 
be low. Data on the overall copy number of the nptII gene would provide a comparative basis for 
the assessment of the potential risk related to the introduction of the nptII gene as an ARM gene 
in Norwegian environments. However, the lack of scientific studies does not allow the overall 
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copy number to be precisely estimated for most Norwegian environments. Changes in the pattern 
of antibiotic use, i.e. increased use of neomycin and/or kanamycin, as well as new information on 
nptII gene prevalence (i.e. relative copy number considerations) in relevant Norwegian 
environments may alter the risk assessment. Veterinary usage of aminoglycosides such as 
neomycin in Europe, including Norway, may create selective conditions for bacterial 
transformants harbouring ARM genes. The ad hoc group recommends that more quantitative data 
on the occurrence of the nptII gene (i.e. relative copy number considerations) in relevant 




 Group 2. The blaTEM-1 allele is unlikely to be present at high concentrations in natural 
environments in Norway. However, clinical studies of E. coli and other enterobacterial isolates 
suggest that the blaTEM-1 gene is present in considerable quantities in the intestinal system of 
humans. Despite the apparent high prevalence of this gene among bacteria that are widely 
distributed in anthropogenic environments, the antibiotics to which the blaTEM-1 gene confers 
resistance remain some of the most used in the world. The str gene has been identified across a 
range of habitats in Europe, although concentration estimates are rarely provided. Little 
information is available on the cat gene distribution among species and environments in Europe. 
The antibiotics to which the blaTEM-1 gene and the str gene confer resistance are widely used in 
clinical and veterinary treatment of infections in Europe, including Norway (NORM/NORM-
VET, 2004). The broad usage and utility of these antibiotics, combined with the observation of 
emerging ampicillin resistance in previously susceptible species, suggest caution should be 
applied in the dissemination of resistance genes in environments that are selective for bacterial 
transformants carrying ARM genes. The ad hoc panel is of the opinion that the expected low 
usage levels of the Group 2 ARM genes will not create an observable change in the clinical 
prevalence or importance of these genes in Norway. 
 
 
 Group 3. The ad hoc group adheres to assessment made in the EFSA opinion concluding 
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The tables provide some examples of phenotypic resistance data collected by the NORM/NORM-
VET surveillance programme in Norway (NORM/NORM-VET, 2004) See NORM/NORM-VET 
(2004) for definitions of resistance.  
Abbreviations: S=sensitive, I=intermediate, R=resistant.  
 
Table a. Antimicrobial resistance of Escherichia coli from human clinical 
isolates (blood cultures) in Norway 2000-2003. 
Substance Resistance (%) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Chlor-
amphenicol 
- - - - 
Ampicillin 
 
28.0 (n=168) 28.1 (n=697) 26.5 (n=973) 30.1 (n=966) 
Streptomycin 
 













0.0  - - - 
 
 
Table b. Antimicrobial resistance of Enterococcus spp. from human clinical 
isolates (blood cultures) in Norway 2000-2003. 
Substance Resistance (%) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Chlor-
amphenicol 

































- - - - 
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Table c. Antimicrobial resistance of Enterococcus faecalis from human 
clinical isolates (blood cultures) in Norway 2000-2003. 
Substance Resistance (%) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Chlor-
amphenicol 
- - - - 
Ampicillin 
 



























Table d. Antimicrobial resistance of Enterococcus faecium from human 
clinical isolates (blood cultures) in Norway 2000-2003.  
Substance Resistance (%) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Chlor-
amphenicol 


























- - - - 
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Table e. Antimicrobial resistance of Enterococcus faecalis from animal and food in Norway 
2000-2003  
Substance Sample Resistance (%) 








































































































































































































Table e. continued. Antimicrobial resistance of Enterococcus faecium from animal and 
food in Norway 2000-2003. 
Substance Sample Resistance (%) 


































































































































































































Table f. Antimicrobial resistance of Escherichia coli from animals and food in Norway 2000-2003. 
Substance Sample Resistance (%) 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 
Chlor-
amphenicol 
Dog food (meat by-products) 
Poultry (meat) 
Poultry (faecal) 
Poultry (clinical isolates) 
Pork (meat) 
Porcine (faecal) 

















































Ampicillin Dog food (meat by-products) 
Poultry (meat) 
Poultry (faecal) 
Poultry (clinical isolates) 
Pork (meat) 
Porcine (faecal) 

















































Streptomycin Dog food (meat byproducts) 
Poultry (meat) 
Poultry (faecal) 
Poultry (clinical isolates) 
Pork (meat) 
Porcine (faecal) 



















































Dog food (meat by-products) 
Poultry (meat) 
Poultry (faecal) 
Poultry (clinical isolates) 
Pork (meat) 
Porcine (faecal) 










































































































Dog food (meat by-products) 
Poultry (meat) 
Poultry (faecal) 
Poultry (clinical isolates) 
Pork (meat) 
Porcine (faecal) 

















































-; not done 
 
 
 
